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NUMBER 1

Some Problems in Tocqueville Scholarship

I

April 16, of this year will be the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Alexis de Tocqueville. As a new century of Tocqueville scholarship begins there is need to recall some of the work accomplished and to project the desirable direction to be taken by future Tocqueville studies.¹ In 1935 occurred the one hundredth anniversary of Tocqueville's *Democracy*. It occasioned a great deal of discussion of Tocqueville's position in modern thought, much of it profound. Two products of that time now stand out, Professor Pierson's crowning study *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (1938), and Professor Albert Salomon's interpretive essay "Tocqueville's Philosophy of Freedom," (1939) still the best in its field.² The latter in particular lent new stature to Tocqueville, presenting him as the author of an image of man, which in our modern plight, we welcome for its grandeur and power.

Three years ago another anniversary occurred, the centenary of Tocqueville's *L'Ancien Régime*. But the picture this time is rather different. Though many historical articles on this scholar-statesman have appeared, they are often lacking in the precision, depth and range which marked those of two decades ago.³ A

¹ An earlier version of this paper with the title "Tocqueville and the Aristocratic Retrospect" was read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December, 1956.

² George W. Pierson, *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (New York: Oxford, 1938); Albert Salomon, "Tocqueville's Philosophy of Freedom (A Trend Towards Concrete Sociology)," *The Review of Politics*, I (1939), 400-431.

³ For a list of representative articles and books since 1935 see Appendix *infra* 18.

major exception is the publication in process in France of Tocqueville's work in a definitive edition.⁴ This monumental undertaking, under the direction of J. P. Mayer, invites the historical profession, once again, to ask what place it shall assign to Tocqueville in the study of modern society.

This is not an easy question. Opinions differ widely on his role both in history and in the writing of history. The possible choices offered here may be illustrated from an earlier and a more recent judgement on Tocqueville's ultimate place in the tradition of lasting scholarship. In the concluding paragraphs of his book Professor Pierson, after estimating the limitations and "enduring qualities" of the *Democracy*, felt free to write of Tocqueville that his "was a mind that fell short of genius. But he had used it to pioneer. And as a pioneer he would be followed and long honoured. And this would be true despite his foreboding anxiety and his failure to comprehend the whole thought of his time."⁵

This critical assessment, preceded by 776 pages of analysis, may be compared with a recent and very brief indication of one possible turn in the direction of Tocqueville scholarship. In a humble and devoted evaluation Professor J. A. Lukacs in his review of Tocqueville's *Oeuvres complètes*, for the September, 1956, issue of *The Journal of Modern History*, pleaded with his colleagues to regard Tocqueville "as the greatest historical thinker of the past four or five centuries..."⁶ The differences implied here are sufficient to suggest that the student of Tocqueville has before him many avenues of investigation before the total character and achievement of the man will be known. It is the purpose of this paper to indicate some of the paths which these studies might take and their possible historical significance.

⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. J. P. Mayer. Édition définitive (4 tomes; Paris: Gallimard, 1951-1958). Tome I, *De la démocratie en Amérique*. Introduction par Harold J. Laski, 2 vols. Tome II, *L'Ancien Régime et la révolution*. Introduction par Georges Lefebvre. *Fragments et notes inédites sur la révolution*. Texte établi et annoté par André Jardin. Tome VI, *Correspondance anglaise*. Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville avec Henry Reeve et John Stuart Mill. Texte établi et annoté par J. P. Mayer et Gustave Rudler. Introduction par J. P. Mayer. Tome V, *Voyages en Sicile et Aux États-Unis*. Texte établi, annoté et préfacé par J. P. Mayer. *Voyages en Angleterre, Irlande, Suisse et Algérie*. Texte établi et annoté par J. P. Mayer et André Jardin. Avertissement par J. P. Mayer. 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958.

⁵ Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont, *Tocqueville and Beaumont*, 771.

⁶ J. A. Lukacs, reviewing Alexis de Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, in *The Journal of Modern History*, XXVIII (1956), 284.

II

Future historical studies of Tocqueville might begin with a kind of discourtesy toward this great and gentle historian—with a deliberate decision to curb the enthusiasm provoked by his success as a prophet. His uncanny talent along this line tends to bewitch the historian. It is, in fact, almost impossible to read anything of Tocqueville without coming under the spell of this enchanting quality. Here one may recall not only his famous and cruelly accurate prediction of the totalitarian weakness inherent in mass societies, but also his equally accurate prediction that the shareholders of the Suez Canal were sure to lose their money, to be ruined.⁷ Tocqueville was himself not uncritical of his compulsion to prophesy. More than once he comments on the limits of this art. During the crisis of 1848 he was particularly conscious of this danger, and in the midst of his own prophecies he warned that fundamental changes in the course of civilizations can be seen only dimly by the generations approaching these events.⁸

Nevertheless there may be historians who are reluctant to forego the image of Tocqueville as prophet. If so then their path is clear. The relationship of profane prophecy to historical understanding is largely unexplored, and it is into this realm that they are obliged to venture.

III

The historian who neglects Tocqueville the prophet to study his unique creative personality need not be long in seeking problems of sufficient complexity. He may begin with an analysis of the astonishing maturity of Tocqueville's judgements even before he made his voyage to America. This maturity is especially evidenced in a series of letters reflecting his response to the July Revolution.⁹ Most men of twenty-five, even men of brilliance, would, when presented with a crisis of this dramatic character, have fixed their attention on personalities and the riot of rumor which attends sud-

⁷ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Correspondence and Conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior from 1834 to 1859*, ed. M.C.M. Simpson, 2 vols., London, 1872, II, 142.

⁸ Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, pub. Madame de Tocqueville, ed. G. Beaumont 9 vols., Paris 1864-1875, V, 460-461. (Tocqueville to E. Stoffels, April 28, 1850), cf. also *ibid.*, VI, p. 151, Tocqueville to Mrs. Grote, July 24, 1850.

⁹ *Ibid.*, VI, 19-20 (Tocqueville to Edouard de Tocqueville, April 6, 1830), VI, pp. 5-6; Tocqueville to Edouard de Tocqueville August 9, 1829.

den changes in governments. Not so Tocqueville. He was primarily anxious to fit the Revolution into a wider pattern dominated by the phenomena of class conflict.¹⁰ Beyond this he sought to interpret the events of the spring and summer of 1830 against the background of his already developing views on the fundamental character of modern civilization.¹¹ Professor Pierson has, of course, traced some of the sources for this breadth of inquiry and conceptualization in his account of Tocqueville's family and environment.¹² There is still room, however, for a further scrutiny of his formative years.

Such a work might seek, among other things, to reconstruct Tocqueville's appreciation of the period of the Restoration. The achievement of this time contributed decisively to Tocqueville's earliest conviction that the aftermath of the French Revolution could continue to be a time of positive and steady growth in political stability and liberty. In an unpublished letter sent from Cincinnati in December of 1831, Tocqueville insisted that those living in an epoch of transition leading to greater freedom or to despotism could yet draw upon the great accomplishments in the time since 1791.¹³ It was, he thought, an "incontestable fact" that "immense progress" had been made in the practical intelligence and translation of the ideas of liberty.¹⁴ The Restoration was seen as giving France the fruits of fifteen years of freedom.¹⁵ Identifying the source of his optimism, which was not American, Tocqueville confessed:

I do not know if we are destined to be free, but that which is certain is that we are infinitely less capable of being so than we were forty years ago. If the Restoration had endured ten more years, I believe that we would have been saved; the habit of lawfulness and of constitutional forms was completely penetrating our manners.¹⁶

Given this view of France's history, Tocqueville was prepared to welcome and praise in the *Democracy* such habits more perfectly developed in America.

¹⁰ Yale Tocqueville Mss, A VI, Tocqueville to Stoffels, August 26, 1830. Hereafter this collection will be cited as Y.T. Mss.

¹¹ Y.T. Mss. A VI, Tocqueville to Stoffels, April 21, 1830.

¹² Pierson, *Tocqueville and Beaumont*, 13-25.

¹³ Y.T. Mss B.I. a. (2), Tocqueville to Hippolyte de Tocqueville (?), December 4, 1831.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

IV

The relationship of Tocqueville's experience in America to the construction and final format of his *Democracy* has been acutely exhibited by Professor Pierson. We do not yet have, however, a definitive edition of the *Democracy* based on an exhaustive use of all the notebooks, correspondence, drafts and the working manuscript of the *Democracy* in the Yale Tocqueville collection.¹⁷ The significance of this difficult task can not be overestimated.

In imitation of Professor Pierson's book there are many additional aspects of the *Democracy* to be investigated through the use of the numerous manuscripts. Here a most important problem is that of identifying more precisely the sources of Tocqueville's legion of generalizations on the spirit of the modern age, which make up the substance of the enigmatic second part of the *Democracy*. The reader of this concluding volume is often at a loss to account for the scope and boldness of the all-inclusive deductions which enhance Tocqueville's reputation as a seer. One recalls his confident assurance that in France the individual committed to the race for material happiness who breaks down under the pressure of this game will commit suicide whereas in America he will merely go insane.¹⁸ Here it may be inferred that Tocqueville's development of this generous distinction rested in part on statistics which he gathered from the press and journals of his day. I do not know the precise source for this idea, but there are other more well known aspects of Tocqueville's fundamental views which can for illustration be traced to some of their origins.

The notebooks in which Tocqueville wrote and literally scratched out his germinal ideas and the drafts for the second part of the *Democracy* contain innumerable leads to the often prosaic genesis of his grand theories. To begin with a minor example, in the *Democracy*, when treating of the centralization of government, Tocqueville took the occasion to fix a point by noting the centralizing success of the reigning pasha of Egypt.¹⁹ The notebooks indicate that the basis for this comparison was no erudite literature but an article which Tocqueville read in the *Revue des deux Mondes*

¹⁷ G. W. Pierson, "The Manuscript of Tocqueville's *De la démocratie en Amérique*," *The Yale University Library Gazette*, XXIX (1955), 115-125 (postscript 178).

¹⁸ Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Mayer ed., I, pt. 2, p. 145, *De la démocratie en Amérique*.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 307.

for the first of March, 1838.²⁰ In Tocqueville's hands this article of passing significance on Mohammed Ali became a "symptom of the times."²¹ The drafts further reveal that his fundamental critique of the centralizing compulsion of modern governments rested in large part in his personal dissatisfaction with the day-to-day decisions of the government of Louis Philippe as it tried to come to grips with the issues growing out of the increasing industrialization of France. On the thirtieth of June, 1837, he observed with ironic distaste the language of the journal *Le Siècle*, for the previous month, in which it had encouraged the idea that the government should not only maintain the railroads but also the metallurgical resources of France.²² Such ideas were, he noted, the natural results of democratic passions, accomodating in an industrial society the aggrandizement of the central power. With this material he projected an image of the states of the future as enormous industrial enterprises dominating the life and capitalization of industry.²³

On this same subject, on May 27, 1837, while thinking through the theme of centralization, Tocqueville recorded the gist of a conversation with Adolph Thiers. In their talk Thiers told Tocqueville that while serving on a commission to consider a railroad from Lyons to Marseilles, "he had finished by convincing *all* the members of this commission that the great public works ought always in France to be built at the expense of the State and by its agents."²⁴ To this Tocqueville added "Do not forget that when I come to speak of the ultra-centralizing tendency of our day."²⁵ The reconstruction of many of Tocqueville's most prescient generalizations is thus open to the historian willing to piece together the fragments of his notebooks. Such a work of reconstruction will not lessen the genius of Tocqueville, but it will make possible significant distinctions between those generalizations issuing from his imaginative logic and those ideas more concretely dependent upon his close observations of the history of France in the first decade of the July Monarchy.

²⁰ Y.T. Mss C.V. g. "Brouillons des chapitres de la second partie de la Démocratie," Cahier II, p. 136. For the article cf. Augusta Colin, "Lettres sur l'Égypte—Administration territorials du pacha," *Revue des deux Mondes*, XIII (1838), 655-671.

²¹ Y.T. Mss. C.V. g., 136.

²² *Ibid.*, 123.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Y.T. Mss C.V. d. "Paquet No. 5," 30.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Tocqueville's correspondence during these years also contributes, as it to be expected, to an understanding of the roots of his compelling generalizations and predictions. Here one of the most impressive aspects of Tocqueville's work is his portrait of the psychological make-up of the average man in a democratic society. Tocqueville, as is well known, was disheartened by the self-centered egotism he saw as a predominant feature of modern man. This is a theme interwoven throughout the final volume of the *Democracy*. Yet it was not the citizens of Syracuse, Philadelphia, or Boston who confirmed Tocqueville in this view, but rather his own neighbors in Normandy. In June of 1838 Tocqueville sent a fretful letter on this subject to Royer-Collard, in which he complained that although he held in sincere and even warm affection his fellow countrymen, their passive egotism oppressed him to the point of despair.²⁶ Their absorption in their narrow personal concerns, their incapacity for commitments beyond those of self-interest, made them, Tocqueville regretted, "honest men, but poor citizens."²⁷ To this lament Royer-Collard replied that Tocqueville's ill-humor towards his neighbors was unjust. For "your Normans—they are France, they are the world," and he added that they were dominated by the prudent and intelligent egotism of the men of their age.²⁸ Do not, the famous *Doctrinaire* advised, waste any of your time burning incense before this idol, disengage yourself, think and write, go back to your books as if you were alone.²⁹ Tocqueville took this advice, and in time his ennui in the Normandy countryside was translated into one of the major conceptions of his life. It is certainly a tribute to Tocqueville's genius that this and other similar impressions, which might have remained merely the chronic complaint of a sensitive mind, gave, when developed and incorporated into the *Democracy*, a portrait of the individual citizen in modern society which has become universally accepted.

V

Tocqueville's inability to tolerate mediocrity in his own environment was but one reflection of the enormous demands which he made upon himself. These heroic burdens, before the *Democracy*

²⁶ Léon d'Estresse de Lanza de Labarie, "L'Amitié de Tocqueville et de Royer-Collard," *Revue des deux Mondes*, LVIII (1930), 899. Tocqueville to Royer-Collard, June 22, 1838.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Royer-Collard to Tocqueville, July 31, 1838.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

was finished and in one sense before it was begun, compelled Tocqueville to seek a political career of the first importance. This aspect of Tocqueville's life has likewise been inadequately studied. Yet the necessity for such an analysis can hardly be overstated. Tocqueville brought to this career all of his aspirations to found the new society, which he believed he had assisted in but one vital fashion in his *Democracy*. There is a glimpse of his virtual passion to aid that society in a reminder placed in his notebooks for 1840: "Far from wishing to halt the development of the new society, I strive to bring it forth."³⁰

In 1837, the year he first tried and failed to enter the Chamber of Deputies, Tocqueville freely discussed the scope of his ambition, confessing: "I admit that a great reputation acquired by honest means has always seemed to me the most precious thing in this world, and the only thing worth the sacrifice of one's time, one's fortune, and even the price of one's life."³¹ When Tocqueville was finally successful in the campaign of 1839, that victory was prefaced by an appeal to the electors of the arrondissement of Valognes affirming without mitigation the intention of his career:

There is now in France, and I am not afraid to say, in Europe, another man who has made clearer in the most public manner that the ancient aristocratic society has disappeared forever, and that it only remains for the men of our times to organize progressively and prudently the new democratic society on its ruins.³²

At the end of his public career Tocqueville had yet to acknowledge the force of that political life. While struggling to begin his history of the French Revolution, he tried to explain to a friend something of the tension involved: "I should like to be able to find a work for my mind far from public affairs," he wrote, "but that is easier to desire than to do. Politics is like certain women who have, so they say, the power to move and trouble one long after they are no longer loved."³³ And again in the next to the last spring of his life, two years after his *L'Ancien Régime* had received a mag-

³⁰ Y.T. Mss C.V.K. "Paquet No. 17 1^{er} Cahier," 44. Fragments, idées que je ne puis placer dans l'ouvrage (mars 1840)."

³¹ Léon d'Estresse de Lanza de Labarie, 893, Tocqueville to Royer-Collard, August 30, 1837.

³² Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Beaumont ed., IX, 224, "Circulaire Addressée aux Electeurs de l'Arrondissement de Valognes."

³³ *Ibid.*, VI, 173, Tocqueville to the Comtesse de Circourt, February 14, 1851.

nificent reception, Tocqueville still felt obliged to write, "There is no happiness comparable to political success. . . ."³⁴

The study and interpretation of Tocqueville's presence in the world of affairs will be greatly aided by the forthcoming publication of his political writings and discourses. To appreciate this coming material fully, we need a day-to-day construction of Tocqueville's political activity, something that has never been done. This demands an accurate account of his circle, and even more important, a close study of his voting record, both under the Monarchy and during the Second Republic.

When we have in detail such a record, it will be possible to penetrate a little further the problem of his lack of success as a parliamentarian. Tocqueville was inclined to trace this disappointment to his unwillingness to be a party man and to the more austere personality he exhibited in public. He was also willing after 1851 to suggest that the intellectual can never permanently affect the course of history in the theatre of action.³⁵ This later interpretation is a tempting one, but it leaves unresolved why this should be so in every case. The danger here is allowing one's sympathy with Tocqueville to suggest that he was above his time, beyond its spiritual compass.

There is in fact in Tocqueville's writing, outside of the *Democracy*, almost a lacuna with regard to the broader problems of legislative practice. He had, it is true, certain fixed ideas such as a realistic appreciation that this activity involved immersion in petty and unspectacular detail, and a strong distaste for a unicameral legislature. His consideration of the problems of representative government does not, however, match the attention given to these matters by the political thinkers of the Restoration.

The historian conscious of Tocqueville's now classical stature as a great moralist is tempted to subscribe to Tocqueville's belief that the spiritual and moral direction of any government more decisively determines its achievements than does the specific structure and content of its laws. Another task is to measure the effectiveness and strategic pertinence of this emphasis in the critical historical situations in which Tocqueville participated. In the opening session of the Chamber of Deputies in January of 1848, while the tension

³⁴ Tocqueville, *Correspondence and Conversations*, II, 207.

³⁵ Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Beaumont ed., IX, 117-119. "Discours à La Séance Publique Annuelle (3 Avril, 1852) de L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques."

leading to the insurrection of February was mounting, Tocqueville considered it his greatest responsibility to exhort his colleagues and the government in the highest moral tones. And even after that Revolution became a reality, he clung to the belief that his moral appeal was what the situation most demanded. His appeal was indeed impressive as Tocqueville concluded:

Legislative changes are called for. I am very ready to believe that these changes are not only useful but necessary; thus I believe in the usefulness of electoral reform, in the urgency of parliamentary reform; but I am not so senseless, gentlemen, as not to know that it is not laws themselves which determine the destinies of peoples; no, it is not the mechanism of laws that produces the greatest events of this world; it is the very spirit of government. Keep the laws, if you wish, although I think you would be very wrong to keep them; keep even the men, if that pleases you: for my part, I make no objection to this. But in God's name, change the spirit of government, for, I repeat, this present spirit will lead you to the abyss.³⁶

It is possible to surmise that those who heard Tocqueville's moving words were touched. It is also possible to surmise that those who had heard Tocqueville give a similar address six years earlier, and had listened to his expressions of the same sentiment many times in the intervening years, were at a loss to know from his remarks how they might act, in the pressing hours that remained, to halt a Revolution.³⁷ Without lessening the worth of Tocqueville's preoccupation with the moral climate of politics, the historian may find here a partial explanation for the fact that in Tocqueville's entire political commentary it is virtually impossible to find ten men in public life whom he could respect. This conscious superiority helps to explain not only Tocqueville's limited career, but also is of some assistance in explaining why one of the greatest interpreters of the modern age could have only a qualified impact on his contemporaries.

Yet Tocqueville's consuming passion to help found the new age could have been counted on to bring him past the normal irritation which men of rare talent experience when dealing with lesser men. His failure to achieve an impressive political success lies not so much in his lack of skill in the art of politics but rather in his attitude toward the commanding social problems of his age. The author of the *Democracy* could be expected to endorse the movements

³⁶ *Ibid.*, IX, 535, "Discours Prononcé à la Chambre des Deputes."

³⁷ For Tocqueville's earlier discourse in which he admitted that he gave a kind of "sermon" cf. *ibid.*, IX, 374-388.

for political reform proposed during the life of the July Monarchy. Similarly, under the pressure of events creating the Second Republic, he supported, though with reservations, the introduction of such measures as universal suffrage. Tocqueville was not, by the time of the Republic, unique in this posture, and it could earn him no great rewards. He chose, however, during the Republic to adopt an attitude towards the extension of the social obligations of the state which did mark him out. He became one of the bitterest and most vigorous critics of the proposal to interpret the Revolution of 1848 as involving a great social reform to be initiated and implemented by the Republic.

Here it is well known that Tocqueville took this attitude because of his conviction that socialism was inherently totalitarian.³⁸ During the Republic he therefore contributed in no small measure to a division between moderate Republicans and Social Democrats which made possible the victory of Louis Napoleon over the Republic itself. This event forever terminated Tocqueville's political prospects. At critical moments during this struggle Tocqueville was aware of the implications of this division, and yet he could not in conscience act otherwise.

The evolution by Tocqueville of a stern, inflexible critique of socialism is a problem which invites major historical attention. Such an analysis will involve delineating Tocqueville's precise knowledge of the socialist theories of his age. It will also require attention to the moment of Tocqueville's development when he began to fix his view on socialism as the phenomenon most to be dreaded in his struggle against the Leviathan. This decision is closely related in the structure of Tocqueville's thought to his study of the French Revolution. In 1842, when reviewing a book dealing with a system of parole and assistance for those released from prison, Tocqueville sharply challenged the author's suggestion that the State would be the best agency to administer such a service.³⁹ On the contrary, he insisted, Charity ought ever to retain its "independent aspect. . . even in its capriciousness."⁴⁰ Moving then to the heart of his criticism, he asked if the author did not make too much of the misery of the poor classes. Had not the Revolution of '89, he queried, made a great contribution to this question. The Revolution

³⁸ Edward Gargan, *Alexis de Tocqueville: The Critical Years 1848-1851*, Washington, 1955, 121.

³⁹ Tocqueville, *Oeuvres Complètes*, Beaumont, ed., IX, 52-54. "Discours Fair à L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, le 4 Juin, 1842."

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 58.

had equalized the tax burden, destroyed privileges favoring the concentration of wealth in single hands, and multiplied "infinitely" the chances which enabled one to move from poverty to a "comfortable position, even to being rich."⁴¹

Tocqueville was to qualify this praise of the social accomplishment of the Revolution by admitting that all problems were not solved. There is, however, in his writing on this question a preference for seeing the alleviation of want as a provisional matter approachable through charity of the benevolent type. This is consistent despite assertions which would indicate a broader view.⁴² His inner position is nowhere better indicated than in discussion in 1851 with Nassau William Senior on the poor laws of England. After hearing Senior's views, Tocqueville declared:

There is one point, however, on which I have not been able to make up my mind. It is the great question as to the right to relief, whether we should or should not say as a matter of law nobody shall starve. If we give this right, we must, of course, make this relief disagreeable; we must separate families, make the workhouse a prison, and our charity repulsive.⁴³

On the social question central to the history of the Second Republic, Tocqueville was thus compelled to occupy the position of a devastating critic rather than that of the architect of positive plans.

An additional reason for this response to socialism is also to be found in another of his basic views concerning the Revolution. He was convinced that the breakup of the Old Regime was possible because its aristocracy had decisively sponsored the *philosophes* in creating a climate directed at their own destruction. Tocqueville, determined not to imitate the conduct and folly of Enlightenment thinkers, refused to support the revolution of his time. From the viewpoint of this historical analogy, his fierce critique of socialism, his unwillingness to be its Montesquieu, offer a considerable explanation for the failure of socialism in the nineteenth century.

VI

The *coup d'état* of December 2 was an unhappy fulfillment of Tocqueville's constant anxiety over the life expectancy of the Second Republic. Louis Napoleon's success now confirmed Tocqueville's old fear, that of the two currents issuing out of the French Revo-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴² *Ibid.*, VI, 151, Tocqueville to Mrs. Grote, July 24, 1850.

⁴³ Tocqueville, *Correspondence and Conversations*, I, 204-205.

lution, the one directed towards a freer society and the other aimed at creating a new despotism, the darker forces should prevail. Tocqueville was now forced into the political retirement that made possible his return to historical study and writing. Anticipating the defeat of the Republic, Tocqueville had already in 1849 begun to re-examine his conception of the continuing Great Revolution, and to search for the confidence necessary to write its history. He found that trust in part by a practical assessment of his own political accomplishments, concluding that his experience as a man of affairs had prepared him in a unique manner to understand history as one who had shared in its making. He further recovered his sense of dedication to the scholar's vocation by celebrating the idea that when the ultimate play of history is done, the role of the majestic and original thinker far surpasses the place of those who merely "speak the speech" and "saw the air" on history's stage.⁴⁴

The noble discipline which Tocqueville brought to the task of writing his history is reflected in a beautiful letter he wrote in response to a plea for encouragement from his old friend Gustave de Beaumont, whose public career, like Tocqueville's, was ended on December 2. Beaumont had written in March of 1852 describing his efforts to work. Each morning he arose early, went to his desk, picked up his pen, and arranged his writing materials, only to find that his depressive reaction to the political events of the hour paralyzed his intellect and his will to work.⁴⁵ Tocqueville, who was now getting well into his subject, nevertheless hastened to assure Beaumont that he too was not unaffected by their situation. He wrote:

Every day I spend three or four hours in the library on the rue de Richelieu. Despite all this effort to distract myself, I am ceaselessly aware of a bitter sadness which overcomes me, and if I let myself be surprised by it, I am lost for the rest of the day. The life which I am leading would seem to be very pleasant, but the sight of my country, which I glimpse above my books, breaks my heart.⁴⁶

As the months went on, Tocqueville gained increasing insight into

⁴⁴ Gargan, *Alexis de Tocqueville*, 180-195, 235-237.

⁴⁵ Y.T. Mss D. II, "Paquet No. 11 5th Cahier, 41, Beaumont to Tocqueville, March 9, 1852.

⁴⁶ Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Beaumont ed., VI, 85., Tocqueville to Beaumont, May 1, 1852.

his grand problem, whereas Beaumont continued to send pitiful letters of admiration and envy.⁴⁷

Unlike Beaumont, Tocqueville was able to continue and complete his masterpiece on the Old Regime, and to penetrate profoundly the development of the Revolution, because he regained in studying the scene something of the optimism toward the destiny of France and Europe which he had nearly surrendered in the last moments of his political career. That optimism is the more remarkable because Tocqueville brought to his study of the Revolution a sharpened and concrete political sense more conducive to skepticism than faith. The events of 1848 march unseen on every page of his history. His exciting analysis of the struggle between the Parliaments and the King, for example, in which he presents the Parliaments as unwittingly preparing their own demise, is an almost exact replica of his reflections on the role of the Opposition to Louis Philippe's Government in blindly inviting the Revolution of 1848.⁴⁸ Again, Tocqueville's attention to the moment when the Revolution ceased being a single harmonious passion directed against the old order and became a class struggle is also to be traced to his earlier examination of the class struggle which was intrinsic to the history of the Second Republic.⁴⁹

In the process of constructing his history of the French Revolution, Tocqueville never surrendered his right to cast a glance forward at the folly and even cowardice of his own generation. He was encouraged to do this by the redeeming experience of his discovery that perhaps never in the history of humanity had mankind such pride in itself and in its destiny as in the moment when it approached and commenced that Revolution of 1789.⁵⁰ Tocqueville found here the commitment beyond self for which he had searched all his life. This discovery brought a tranquility to Tocqueville's life which he had never experienced. Writing of his work some months before *L'Ancien Régime* was published, Tocqueville described his day to Gobineau in a manner echoing Machiavelli's description of his own habits during the composition of the *Prince*:

⁴⁷ Y.T. Mss D. II, 49, (Beaumont to Tocqueville, April 24, 1852), 54, Beaumont to Tocqueville, June 25, 1852.

⁴⁸ Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 53-78. *L'Ancien Régime Fragments et Notes Inédites*; Tocqueville, *Souvenirs*, ed. Luc Monnier, Paris, 1942, 135.

⁴⁹ Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 71-72; Tocqueville, *Souvenirs*, 135.

I spend the morning in my study where I work seriously, the afternoon in the fields where I watch over work of another kind. . . . The time passes with prodigious rapidity; I have never had it pass for me in a more agreeable manner. It is foolish not to know well the art of living when life is so advanced.⁵⁰

Tocqueville's happiness in his work and in his evocation of the spirit of the Revolution in turn enabled him a year before his life ended to reject and condemn Gobineau's prediction of the inevitable decline of the West.⁵² The study of Tocqueville's historical thought which remains to be done must have as its keystone Tocqueville's reply to Gobineau. For that reply, with its impassioned affirmation in the ability of democratic societies to be free, was written at the moment when Tocqueville was approaching in his history the despotic center of the Revolution. Given this faith, one may, like Beaumont, envy the historian who will provide us with a full portrait of Tocqueville as historian.

In summary, there is great need of a "definitive" biography of Tocqueville.⁵³ That biography should reflect the spirit characteristic of Tocqueville when he confessed to a friend: "My dominant feeling . . . when I find myself in the presence of another human being no matter how humble his position, is that of the original equality of the species, and from then on I am concerned less perhaps to please or to serve him than to not offend his dignity."⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 23, 131-134.

⁵¹ Tocqueville, *Correspondence entre A. de Tocqueville et Arthur de Gobineau, 1843-1859*, ed. L. S. Schemann, Paris, 1909, 49, Tocqueville to Gobineau, November 13, 1855.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 305-309, Tocqueville to Gobineau, January 14, 1857, 311-314, Tocqueville to Gobineau, January 24, 1857.

⁵³ The biography of Tocqueville by J. P. Mayer, *Alexis de Tocqueville*, New York, 1940, is an important work. It is not, however, a definitive biography.

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Business and Currency in the Ohio Gubernatorial Campaign of 1875

The specie resumption controversy of the reconstruction period has generally been treated as a battle between a vaguely defined business-creditor interest centered in the East and a western farmer-debtor group. In recent historiography the return to specie payments in January, 1879, has been placed alongside the protective tariff, railroad land grants, and internal improvement legislation in the program of a triumphant postwar industrial capitalism.¹ Historians have often emphasized the moral fervor of the inflation movement and have portrayed the greenback leaders as idealistic and inexperienced crusaders for the rights of the small farmer oppressed by the power of big business.²

In reality western agrarianism is only one thread in the tangled skein of greenback politics. There is evidence to show that western businessmen frequently supported soft money policies out of fear of the deflationary consequences of specie resumption. It is also clear that greenback politicians on occasion recognized and attempted to exploit this apprehension for political purposes. In one such instance, moreover—the Ohio gubernatorial campaign of 1875—the leading greenback politicians were themselves businessmen who viewed the return to sound money as a threat to their own vital economic interests.

Local economic conditions played an important role in the 1875 political contest. By the Seventies Ohio had become an important industrial state, third in the nation in the number of its manufac-

¹ See, for example, Howard K. Beale, *The Critical Year*, New York, 1930, 144–145, 236ff.; Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, Revised Edition, New York, 1944, II, 105–114, 330–333; Matthew Josephson, *The Politicos*, New York, 1938, 20, 39, 188–193; Paul Studenski and Herman Krooss, *Financial History of the United States*, New York, 1952, 161; Louis M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism*, New York, 1947, 386–387. Among these writers only Professor Beale takes notice of business opposition to resumption, but he views this as an occasional aberration, concluding that: “manufacturers generally sought contraction of the currency along with an increase of tariff rates.” See Beale, 278.

² See, for example, Fred Emory Haynes, *James Baird Weaver*, Iowa City, 1919, *passim*; Allan Nevins, *The Emergence of Modern America, 1865–1878: A History of American Life*, Vol. VIII, New York, 1928, 166–167; Solon J. Buck, *The Agrarian Crusade: The Chronicles of America*, Vol. XLV, New Haven, 1920, 77–98.

turing establishments, and fourth in the size of its industrial labor force and the total value of its manufactures. The state was especially prominent in heavy industry. In 1872 it was second to Pennsylvania in steel rail and pig iron production, while in the census year 1879-80 Ohio blast furnaces employed 8,900 workers compared with Pennsylvania's 13,000 and New York's third place of 2,500. In the same census period the state's bituminous coal production followed closely behind that of second place Illinois.³

But this impressive industrial machine was hard hit by the long depression that followed the financial collapse of September, 1873. Railroad construction in the nation reached a trough for the decade in 1875, and the suppliers of railroad iron in Ohio suffered severely. In the Mahoning Valley of the northeast, the mining areas of the Hocking Valley, and the manufacturing region adjoining the Ohio River, industrial activity fell off rapidly after 1873. Prices for "no. 1 hot-blast charcoal" iron declined almost fifty per cent in the three years following the panic, and scores of Ohio furnaces shut down, throwing thousands out of work. In the mining regions coal lands worth ten million dollars in 1872 had fallen in value to six million by 1877. Cash was so difficult to procure in the coal districts that miners who remained employed were often forced to submit to a "truck" or "scrip" system of wage payment.⁴

The widespread industrial distress had important political consequences. Greenbackism had swept over Ohio in several waves in the Sixties,⁵ but had largely abated in the following decade. The depression served once more to make inflation politically attractive, and on the eve of the 1875 gubernatorial campaign it was revived as a political issue by a faction within the Ohio Democracy.

The leaders of this group were largely new to the Democratic party. Recent converts from the ranks of pre-war Whiggery in a number of instances,⁶ they had not, in one editor's colorful phrase,

³ See the *Railroad Gazette*, VII (October 2, 1875), 408; and United States Bureau of the Census, *Tenth Census, 1880; Census of Manufacturers, passim*.

⁴ Rendigs Fels, "American Business Cycles, 1865-1879," *American Economic Review*, XLI, No. 3 (June, 1951), 347-348; Ohio Secretary of State, *Annual Report for 1875*, 35; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 14, 1875; Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, *First Annual Report for 1877*, 116-117.

⁵ Reginald C. McGrane, "Ohio in the Greenback Movement," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XI, No. 4 (March, 1925), 526-531; Clifford H. Moore, "Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896," *Ohio Archeological and Historical Publications*, XXXVII (1928), 244-266.

⁶ See the *Cincinnati Commercial*, July 2, 1875.

"been Democrats long enough to let the dirt accumulate under their nails."⁷ Men like Thomas Ewing, Jr., Samuel F. Cary, and Robert Schilling, complained Congressman Michael Kerr, were "not democrats at all, in any just sense."⁸ Ambitious for leadership, the newcomers hoped to use inflation to seize political power. A successful greenback platform would consolidate their hold on the party in Ohio and would, perhaps, enable them to dictate the Democratic presidential nomination in 1876. If the money issue proved a vote-getter in the fall canvass, the *Cincinnati Commercial* warned conservative Democrats, the inflationists would "occupy and possess" the Democratic political organization. The next step would see "the worse elements . . . loosed," and the 1876 national campaign would be fought on the currency issue.⁹

Business considerations also drove the inflationists. Ewing was deeply involved in mining and railroad promotion. During the early Seventies the former Union general and his brothers, Charles and Hugh, had invested heavily in railroad stock and central Ohio coal and iron properties.¹⁰ Later in the decade the Ewings expanded their interests to include the manufacture of railroad iron and speculation in western silver lands.¹¹ The panic was a cruel blow to the Ewing fortunes and for the remainder of the decade, General Ewing, hoping to realize something for the family properties, fought every attempt to restore the specie standard. He particularly detested the Republican sponsored Resumption Act of 1875, believing that "if that infernal law were repealed or amended" the family "coal and iron lands would sell at once."¹² Cary too, was a promoter of western mining lands, and during the campaign was accused of fraud in connection with his Colorado silver speculations.¹³ The leaders of the Ohio Democracy, the

⁷ This was the description of the Democratic *Cleveland Herald*, also quoted in Clifford Moore, "Ohio in National Politics," *loc. cit.*, 295-296, n. 19.

⁸ Kerr to Manton Marble, Manitou Springs, Colorado, September 1, 1875, in the Marble MSS., Library of Congress.

⁹ *Cincinnati Commercial*, July 15, 1875. For similar views see also the *Cleveland Leader*, October 7, 1875. During the campaign the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, chief organ of the inflationist Democracy, as if to confirm Republican charges, spoke with anticipation of an inflationist Democratic ticket against Grant in 1876. See the *Enquirer*, September 9, 1875.

¹⁰ Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Hugh Ewing, Lancaster, O., July 29, 1871 and November 17, 1871, in the Ewing Family MSS., Library of Congress.

¹¹ Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Charles Ewing, Columbus, O., July 14, 1873, *ibid.*; and William Thomas Hutchinson, *Cyrus Hall McCormick*, New York, 1935, II, 195.

¹² Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Charles Ewing, Lancaster, August 13, 1877, Ewing Family MSS.

¹³ *Cincinnati Commercial*, June 17, 1875.

Cincinnati Commercial could charge with considerable justice, "want flush times to gamble in, knowing the wreck must come, but confident of their ability to save themselves."¹⁴

At the June Democratic convention in Columbus the resolutions committee had proven subservient to Ewing and his followers, and over the protest of the Cleveland Democracy,¹⁵ accepted an inflationist platform. Ewing had apparently been aided by an understanding with Governor William Allen, an old time Jacksonian sound money man who now had presidential ambitions.¹⁶ When the platform was reported to the convention it carried the Governor's endorsement and was adopted without an open floor fight.¹⁷ Immediately after, Allen was renominated and Cary was given second place on the ticket.

The financial plank of the Democratic platform attacked the most vulnerable spot in the Republican record, the 1875 Resumption Act. This measure, which provided for redeeming the wartime greenbacks in gold on January 1, 1879, had been "railroaded" through the Forty-third Congress by the Republican caucus.¹⁸ Its passage had been shortly followed by a sharp currency contraction which had produced widespread alarm among businessmen.¹⁹ This Republican legislation, the Democratic platform charged, had "already brought disaster to the business of the country," and now threatened it with total "bankruptcy and ruin." The contraction

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, October 1, 1875.

¹⁵ The Cuyahoga County Democratic Convention had, on June 12, adopted a sound money financial plank. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 13, 1875.

¹⁶ Reginald C. McGrane, *William Allen, A Study in Western Democracy*, Columbus, Ohio, 1925, 219, 250ff.

¹⁷ *New York Daily Tribune*, June 21, 1875. The religious question just raised by the Republicans at their state convention was probably an important factor in conservative Democratic acquiescence in the soft money plank. This issue stemmed from the previous legislative session when John J. Geghan, an Irish Democratic member of the lower house, introduced a measure authorizing Catholic chaplains at state hospitals and penal institutions. This measure, passed by the Democratic controlled General Assembly reputedly under Catholic pressure, had done much to stir up the latent nativism of a large segment of the electorate. The Republicans clearly intended to make "no Popery" an important part of their campaign, a fact that did much to reconcile sound money Democrats to the Ewing financial plank. See Harry Barnard, *Rutherford B. Hayes and His America*, New York, 1954, 272-273, for details of this issue.

¹⁸ Concocted in the Republican Senatorial caucus largely to avoid a party breach over the currency issue the bill was passed by a strict party vote. In the House, for example, the majority was composed of 134 Republicans to 2 Democrats. *Congressional Record*, 43 Congress, 2 session, 318-319.

¹⁹ *Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1874*, viii; *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, XX, No. 522 (June 26, 1875), 604.

policy must be abandoned, and, in a clause which clearly opened the door to unlimited monetary expansion, the platform demanded that the volume of the national currency be adjusted "to the wants of trade."²⁰

The gubernatorial campaign which followed the conventions²¹ attracted nationwide attention. The *Chicago Tribune* observed that not since the Lincoln-Douglas Senatorial contest in Illinois had the American public been so interested in a local political canvass.²² Neither Allen nor Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes was deemed worthy of such attention, but the public had accepted the Ohio inflationists at their own estimate. If the greenback won in Ohio, the conservative New York financial weekly, the *Financier*, announced, there was a strong likelihood that the inflationists would carry the Democratic national convention in 1876.²³ The results, moreover, would have an important bearing upon the nation's financial future. "Give the inflationists success in Ohio on the 12th of next month," declared one newspaper, "and the inflation feeling will be overwhelming in the next House of Representatives."²⁴

Despite this latter prospect the Republicans at first tried to ignore the money issue. National chairman John Binney advised the party leaders in Ohio as late as September that it would be "unwise to make the currency issue a prominent part of the canvass." Prudence demanded that it be kept an "open question on which Democrats and Republicans are divided in opinion."²⁵ Local Republicans, including candidate Hayes, sought at first to avoid taking a stand on the Resumption Act.²⁶

However, evasion became increasingly difficult. While the Republicans waved the rather worn bloody shirt, the Democrats were rapidly making the financial question the leading issue of the campaign. Day after day Democratic speakers played on the

²⁰ *The American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1875*, New York, 1877, 606-607.

²¹ The Republican state convention had convened in Columbus just a few days before the Democrats.

²² *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 6, 1875.

²³ *The Financier*, VII (September 25, 1875), 212-213. See also the *Terre Haute Express*, quoted in Forrest William Clonts, "The Political Campaign of 1875 in Ohio," *Ohio Archeological and Historical Quarterly*, XXXI (1922), 40.

²⁴ *Cincinnati Commercial*, September 13, 1875.

²⁵ Binney to E. W. Keyes, quoted in Horace Samuel Merrill, *The Bourbon Democracy of the Middle West, 1865-1896*, Baton Rouge, 1953, 107.

²⁶ See John Quincy Smith to John Sherman, Oakland, O., October 8, 1875, in the Sherman MSS., Library of Congress.

anxieties of businessmen and laborers caught in the worst economic slump in two decades. The Republican Resumption Act would mean "general and inevitable bankruptcy and ruin," asserted Ewing. "The threat of forced resumption . . . had paralyzed all enterprise, and checked all adventures," former Senator George Pendleton claimed.²⁷ "The mines are not worked . . . manufactures have ceased to run, laborers are out of employment, rents have fallen one third." Total industrial stagnation would be the inevitable consequence of the Republican resumption policy.²⁸

Out in the hustings, in the industrial towns of Ironton, Shawnee, Lancaster, Galion, Upper Sandusky, Circleville, Wilmington and Tiffin, Ewing told of "shrinking values, reduced manufactures and trade, . . . suffering among laborers, and bankruptcy among producing and trading capitalists."—The Republican contraction had destroyed business and "the cry of want was going up from every industrial center in the land."²⁹ At Wilmington he pleaded eloquently for the young capitalism of the Mississippi Valley. What manufacturer, he asked, could withstand the jolt of the sixty per cent contraction promised by the Resumption Act? Business could not be conducted without borrowed money, especially in the newer western areas, what businessman could borrow "when he knows that in addition to the interest he pays, seventeen *per cent*, has to be added for the difference between greenbacks now and gold on the first of January 1879?" It was the older men in the East who were lenders of money accumulated over a long business career. The young energetic businessmen who combined the money of the "non-producer" with their skill and talents for the production of goods would be the ones to suffer by the contraction.³⁰

It was soon evident that the Democratic line of argument was being favorably received in the industrial regions. George W. Morgan of the inflationist *Cincinnati Enquirer* observed:

A great revolution is going on in . . . the manufacturing and mining districts. . . . Businessmen, generally, are awakening to the fact that the real issue is between dead capital on the one side, and active capital and labor on the other. Our platform is therefore freed from unmeaning phrases,

²⁷ *Speeches of Governor William Allen, . . . George H. Pendleton, . . . A. G. Thurman, . . . Thomas Ewing, . . . Samuel F. Cary, . . . Before the Democratic Ratification Meeting . . . June 17, 1875, Columbus, 1875, 6-10.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁹ *Speech of Gen. Thomas Ewing Delivered at Ironton . . .*, 4-10.

³⁰ *Joint Discussion Between Gen. Thomas Ewing of Ohio and Gov. Stewart I. Woodford of New York on the Finance Question, 9.*

and the consequence is that thousands of businessmen are uniting with us on business grounds.

Henry Blanding of Zanesville, one of the leading ironmasters of southeastern Ohio, Morgan reported, was canvassing the state for Allen. The Blanding brothers had always been Republican, and their defection would "bring with them a powerful following of men who think as they do."³¹ In Mahoning County, "leading Republicans engaged in the iron business," Judge Rufus P. Ranney predicted, would "pronounce in favor" of the Democrats.³² By mid-September Cary too was prophesying large Democratic gains among workers and capitalists in the coal and iron districts.³³

The Republicans knew that Ewing and Cary were not alone among Ohio businessmen in fearing "forced" resumption. The depression and falling prices made easy money appealing to many Ohio industrialists and the Hayes leaders had evidence that they would have a difficult fight to hold the mill owners to their traditional party affiliations. The Republican Congress that passed the Resumption Act, one Ohio manufacturer wrote to Congressman James A. Garfield, "piled another *mountain of distress*" on top of that produced by the panic. His firm's losses in the previous two years, this Cleveland businessman asserted, had "been not less than 50,000\$ annually in bad debts and from depreciation in selling power of our products" as a consequence of the measure. Only the bankers, he complained, had profited from the rapid "shrinkage of values" of the last few years.³⁴ In the East the papers were reporting that the Democrats would win the vote of "manufacturers and businessmen who had incurred risks, had notes to pay, and look[ed] to inflation as their only hope to unload."³⁵

The Republicans were deeply disturbed by the prospective loss of the business vote. By late June Hayes was conceding in a letter to Senator John Sherman that the tariff and the national finances would be "controlling subjects" in industrial Ohio.³⁶ Soon after, Hayes wrote apprehensively of an impending visit of Republican inflationist William "Pig Iron" Kelley to Ironton in

³¹ Morgan to Samuel J. Randall, Mt. Vernon, O., August 19, 1875, in the Randall MSS., University of Pennsylvania Library.

³² Reported in George W. Morgan to William Allen, Cleveland, O., July 4, 1875, William Allen MSS., Library of Congress.

³³ *New York Daily Tribune*, September 14, 1875.

³⁴ W. C. Andrews to Garfield, Cleveland, O., October 4, 1875, Garfield MSS., Library of Congress.

³⁵ *New York Daily Tribune*, September 13, 1875.

³⁶ Hayes to Sherman, Fremont, O., June 29, 1875, the Sherman MSS.

the southern industrial region.³⁷ "Doubtless there are localities where our position on the currency will be damaging," but on the whole, he asserted with more determination than real conviction, the Republican endorsement of sound money must help. "At any rate," he concluded lamely, "we are right."³⁸

Paralyzed at first by the effective Democratic assault, the Republicans soon rallied and set about reinvigorating their campaign. By late summer the implications for national politics and the national finances of a Democratic victory had become abundantly clear, and from outside the state Republican stalwarts and sound money Independents alike hurried to enter the Ohio battle. "The whole power of the Administration was used against us," wrote Congressman Milton I. Southard. Never before, he later recalled, had there been "such a determined effort" to defeat the Democracy in a local election.³⁹ Senator George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts, a former Secretary of the Treasury, came to Ohio and threw his financial prestige behind the Republican platform.⁴⁰ Massachusetts' junior Senator, Henry L. Dawes, Senator John Ingalls of Kansas, and Congressman Eugene Hale of Maine stumped the state for the sound money cause.⁴¹ "The Republicans," Ewing reported in mid-September, were "spending money freely" to support this "great effort."⁴² Carl Schurz was dragged back from a European visit by the entreaties of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Murat Halstead, and other former Liberal-Republicans who knew Schurz's power to charm the voters among his fellow German-Americans and his influence with the educated independent voter.⁴³ Ohio

³⁷ Although a Republican, Kelley favored an easy money policy. At this point his motives were partly personal since he had important iron investments in Ohio which had been hard hit by the slump. More important, however, Kelley had for years been the chief spokesman in Congress of the Pennsylvania ironmasters who, like their Ohio counterparts, were fearful of "forced" resumption. For Kelley's Ohio investments see Ohio Secretary of State, *Annual Report for 1875*, 431. For the currency attitudes of the Pennsylvania iron interests see my unpublished Columbia University doctoral dissertation, "Men, Money, and Politics: the Specie Resumption Issue, 1865-1879," *passim*.

³⁸ Hayes to John Sherman, Fremont, O., July 5, 1875, the Sherman MSS.

³⁹ Southard to Samuel J. Randall, Zanesville, O., November 15, 1875, the Randall MSS.

⁴⁰ *New York Daily Tribune*, September 18, 1875.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, October 6, 1875.

⁴² Ewing to Samuel J. Randall, Lancaster, O., September 14, 1875, the Randall MSS.

⁴³ George Hoadly to Carl Schurz, Cincinnati, September 24, 1875, in the Schurz MSS., at the Library of Congress. See also Frederic Bancroft, (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, New York, 1913, III, 157-161.

Republicans rapidly took heart and for the first time prepared to face the currency issue squarely. By early September Hayes, former Governor Edward Noyes, Sherman, Garfield, and Thomas Young, nominee for Lieutenant Governor, were on the stump striking out boldly against the "rag baby."⁴⁴

Until a month before election day, however, Democratic victory still appeared certain. In late September Washington observers were predicting that nothing could stop the Allen forces.⁴⁵ But Democratic prospects faded as the contest entered its last weeks and the supreme Republican effort began to tell. In Cincinnati, on September 27, Schurz made his first campaign address to a crowd that overflowed Turner Hall.⁴⁶ In quick succession he made six more scheduled speeches, both in English and German, to large and enthusiastic audiences.⁴⁷ Republican mass meetings in various parts of the state became increasingly exuberant as election day approached. One at Warren in the Reserve was attended by some twenty-five thousand Ohioans who listened to speeches by Noyes, Garfield and Senator Ben Wade; applauded the fifteen brass bands that blared patriotic music; goggled at maneuvering artillery and fire companies; and marched in procession carrying banners inscribed "In Hayes we Trust, In Allen we Bust," and "Allen and Cary, Not a Vote Nary." The rally was, a visiting Chicago reporter wrote, one of the most colossal affairs in the political history of the state.⁴⁸

The rest of the Republican battery of campaigners, both the imported and domestic varieties, were out in force in the weeks before the October election date.⁴⁹ The campaign entered a new phase as the Republicans sought to awaken middle class fears of anarchy and confiscation. "Inflation means the repudiation of all debts public and private, the utter destruction of credit, and a long lapse toward barbarism," pronounced Murat Halstead's *Cincinnati Commercial*.⁵⁰ "A vote for the Democratic ticket is encourage-

⁴⁴ *New York Daily Tribune*, September 4, 1875; *ibid.*, October 6, 1875; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 6, 1875.

⁴⁵ See the manuscript diary of James A. Garfield, entry for September 22, 1875, in the Garfield MSS.

⁴⁶ The full speech was reported in the *Chicago Daily Tribune* of September 28, 1875.

⁴⁷ Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz*, New York, 1908, III, 362-363; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 5, 1875; and the *New York Times*, October 1, 1875.

⁴⁸ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 24, 1875.

⁴⁹ See the *New York Daily Tribune*, October 6, 1875.

⁵⁰ *Cincinnati Commercial*, September 12, 1875.

ment . . . to communist revolution," the *Cincinnati Gazette* shouted.⁵¹ Every man with a home mortgage who voted for Allen and inflation was, it was asserted, voting for foreclosure of that mortgage.⁵²

The inflationists were inciting class war. Cary's speeches were "calculated to do the greatest possible mischief in stirring up strife between what he is pleased to call 'classes' of the people."⁵³ The Democratic campaign reminded the *Gazette* of the period of the French Revolution "when such men as Cary, Ewing, Pendleton, and Kelley rose to the surface . . . appealing to the masses against property and capital."⁵⁴ The Hayes papers made much of Kelley's "intemperate" address to the mill operators at Ironton. The Pennsylvania Congressman, resented the more for his Republican affiliations, was accused of wishing "to set up a division of classes, to divide the laboring class from the rest, and to persuade the workingmen that their interests were hostile to the rest."⁵⁵ The *Commercial* in its issue of August 9 featured a four-column Nast cartoon depicting Kelley releasing a "rag baby" jack-in-the-box as he brandished a "bullionist heart" on a spear, while above and around his head was inscribed "Vive la Guillotine," "Tremble Tyrants," "the Sans Culottes are coming," and "more greenbacks or death."⁵⁶

The Republicans skillfully played upon all the social prejudices that permeated late nineteenth century mid-western America. The Democrats and their platform were disreputable, dishonest, and immoral. Cary was taken to task by the Republican press for "dirty harangues," in one of which, it was alleged, he had charged the daughters of "rich men" with "curvature of morals."⁵⁷ In an address at Marion in August Hayes asserted that "overtrading and fast living" always accompanied the sort of currency scheme cooked up by the Democracy.⁵⁸ The Democrats, Schurz told his Cincinnati audience, were attempting to force the state of Ohio to endorse a financial policy "which, if followed by the National Government . . . would make our political and business life more than ever a hot-bed of gambling and corruption, and plunge the country into all those depths of moral . . . bankruptcy and ruin . . .

⁵¹ *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, October 12, 1875.

⁵² *Cleveland Leader*, October 5, 1875.

⁵³ *Cincinnati Commercial*, August 4, 1875.

⁵⁴ *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, August 4, 1875.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, September 7, 1875.

⁵⁶ *Cincinnati Commercial*, August 9, 1875.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, August 8, 1875.

⁵⁸ *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, August 2, 1875.

which never fails to follow a course so utterly demented in its wickedness." To entrust to any government the power to increase or decrease the national currency at will, as the inflationists intended, would have disastrous consequences. "The private fortune of every citizen is placed at the mercy of the government's arbitrary pleasure" by such a course. No business venture would be safe, no contract secure: only speculators and promoters would gain. "The rings would thrive and honest men would pay the cost."⁵⁹

By the last days of the campaign the political prospects had drastically altered, and by early October the Democrats had begun to lose confidence.⁶⁰ And in the end the Republican effort was successful. First returns on October 13 were indecisive, but by the 16th the victory of Hayes was clearly established. The Republican margin of victory was narrow, however, with Hayes receiving 297,817 votes to Allen's 292,273. Only five thousand votes separated the candidates out of a total of almost six hundred thousand cast.⁶¹

The defeated Democrats indulged in much post-election soul-searching. The Ohio hard money faction believed the defeat a just punishment for the party's desertion of traditional sound financial principles, and cursed Allen, Ewing, and the rest of the inflationist leaders.⁶² The inflationists, on the other hand, blamed the "treachery" of the eastern hard money Democrats. The *New York World*, organ of Samuel Tilden and August Belmont, had attacked Allen violently, and during the campaign had been circulated as a Republican campaign document.⁶³ These "eastern gentlemen," the *Cincinnati Enquirer* promised, "will not be forgotten. They have built up a good account which will be settled in good time."⁶⁴

Doubtless the most important single factor in the defeat was the successful mobilization of middle-class urban Protestant opinion against the inflationists. The contest brought out the largest vote of any election in the state's history,⁶⁵ and it was Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati, the centers of "trade and culture," that gave the

⁵⁹ *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 28, 1875.

⁶⁰ See the *New York Daily Tribune*, October 6, 1875.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, October 23, 1875.

⁶² *Ibid.*, October 14, 1875.

⁶³ *New York Herald*, December 2, 1875, quoting the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, December 2, 1875.

⁶⁴ *Enquirer*, October 13, 1875.

⁶⁵ Clonts, "The Political Campaign of 1875 in Ohio," *loc cit.*, 86.

Republicans their majority.⁶⁶ The Ohio fight, the *New York Times* remarked, was "won in the cities, the larger towns, and the populous intelligent counties where daily newspapers, good schools, and speakers like Schurz [and] Garfield . . . got in their good work."⁶⁷ In particular the urbanized and commercial northern tier of the Western Reserve, a part of the state settled by New Englanders and retaining much of the Yankee ethical approach to political affairs, turned out in force for Hayes.⁶⁸ Ashtabula County, "the most Puritanical part" of Ohio, lamented the Democratic *Chicago Times*, carried the Reserve for the Republicans.⁶⁹

The political puritans had also rallied to the cause of "honest" finance. The Liberals, the clean government men and independents who had voted for Horace Greeley in 1872, apparently voted for Hayes three years later. Carl Schurz, observers were certain, had succeeded in getting out the old Liberal vote. "If it had not been for that crout-eating Greeley-ite," wrote one peeved Pennsylvania Democrat, the state would assuredly have gone for Allen.⁷⁰ To the Germans and the independents Schurz had made the campaign into a crusade for the middle-class virtues, and they responded at the polls. The margin of victory in Ohio was small, independent Henry Adams wrote an English friend, "but every man of that five thousand was one of us."⁷¹

Nevertheless the inflation platform had not been a total failure. The soft money slogans were indeed successful in converting hard times into Democratic votes in the industrial districts. As the dispatches reporting the news of Democratic defeat pointed out, the party had made advances over the 1873 gubernatorial race in the coal and iron regions. In the manufacturing towns of Steubenville, Youngstown, Canton, and Wooster substantial gains for Allen were

⁶⁶ *New York Daily Tribune*, November 1, 1875.

⁶⁷ *New York Times*, October 14, 1875.

⁶⁸ *Cleveland Leader*, November 21, 1875.

⁶⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, November 26, 1875.

⁷⁰ J. M. Cooper to Chauncey Black, Harrisburg, Penna., October 21, 1875, in the Jeremiah S. Black MSS. at the Library of Congress.

⁷¹ Henry Adams to Charles Milnes Gaskell, Beverly Farms, Mass., October 15, 1875, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., *Letters of Henry Adams, 1858-1891*, Boston, 1930, I, 272. It is difficult to find confirmation for the impressionistic material concerning the independent vote. A comparison of county returns for 1872 and 1875 does indicate, however, that in the two urban centers of Cleveland and Cincinnati large majorities for Liberal-Republican Greeley in 1872 were converted into large majorities for Hayes in 1875. In normally Democratic Columbus the Allen majority was considerably below that of Greeley in 1872. The county returns may be found in Ohio Secretary of State, *Annual Report for 1875*.

scored.⁷² Pennsylvania Democrats, scanning the Ohio returns for a forecast of their own state campaign, noted that the inflation platform had carried the Ohio mining districts.⁷³

It is impossible to determine conclusively from the available data the voting pattern of the ironmasters and coal operators of Ohio.⁷⁴ But it is difficult to believe that some of the very real antagonism to deflation among the state's manufacturers during the fall of 1875 was not transformed into Democratic votes. The voting preferences of the state's industrial leaders are not, however, as interesting as the nature of the contending forces in the 1875 canvass. Far from being spokesmen of agrarian debtors, the Ohio inflationists accepted the dominant business ethic of the Gilded Age and pitched their soft money appeal to western industrial aspirations. Nor were the financial conservatives the minions of industrial capital. In the 1875 contest the sound money forces were compelled to marshal the respectable commercial and professional middle-class to counteract the strong inflationist inclinations of the leaders of Ohio industry.

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⁷² *New York Daily Tribune*, October 13, 1875.

⁷³ J. M. Cooper to Chauncey Black, Harrisburg, Penna., October 21, 1875, in the Black MSS.

⁷⁴ An analysis of the six leading coal mining counties and the nine leading iron and steel producing counties of the state does, in fact, reveal substantial Democratic percentage gains over the previous state contest. But there is no way of determining the vote of the mine operators or the ironmasters from this data since their numbers could not have been great enough to affect the voting percentage substantially.

The Failure of German Propaganda in the United States, 1914-1917

Since German propaganda was primarily directed toward the American of German descent, the United States, prior to its entry into the European conflict, would seem to have been a fertile field for the operation of an effective propaganda movement. With the aid of Spencerian sociology and Darwinian biology, the Anglo-Saxon dogma, then current in the United States, "became the chief element in American racism in the imperial era."¹ Like other varieties of racism, Anglo-Saxonism was a product of modern nationalism and the romantic movement, rather than an outgrowth of biological science.² Many Americans readily agreed with James K. Hosmer, the author of *Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom*, who believed that the primacy of the world lay with the Anglo-Saxon race. "English institutions, English speech, and English thought," said Hosmer, "are to become the main features of the political, social, and intellectual life of mankind."³ The implications of the Anglo-Saxon cult gave way to a hostile attitude by native Americans toward their immigrant population.

While the patterns of American nativism cannot be dealt with in this paper, it is generally accepted that native Americans greatly resented what they believed to be the non-Americanization of the three most important racial groups of nineteenth-century immigration, namely, the Germans, Italians, and Poles, in that order. This antagonism hindered the process of assimilation because it weakened an old bond of understanding, if not of union. Into the world of American Protestantism millions of non-Protestants were pouring, unprovided with new ways of life by an American society itself perplexed and drifting.⁴ The advocates of immigration restriction insisted that the immigrant's nationality and special national loyalties persisted for many generations even when the individual descendants

¹ Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, Boston, 1955, 172.

² Stow Persons ed., *Evolutionary Thought in America*, New York, 1956, 439.

³ Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism*, 174. For a more elaborate treatment: of the Anglo-Saxon cult, see Josiah Strong, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis*, New York, 1912, 180-222.

⁴ D. W. Brogan, *The American Character*, New York, 1944, 102.

of the original immigrants were almost completely assimilated. This nationality, they declared, was contradictory and inconsistent with American nationality.⁵ Writers of the American scene were quick to point out that the one thing vainly asked for in New York City "is a distinctly American community."⁶ As elements of the so-called "new immigration" streamed into the United States after the Civil War, the various national groups not only conflicted with native Americans, but also with each other, causing periodic crises within the American community.⁷ The inevitable reaction on the part of native Americans was the establishment of defense organizations.

The "nationalist nineties" saw the growth of numerous *ad hoc* nativist organizations like The National League for the Protection of American Institutions, The American Protective Association, and the Immigration Restriction League. The nation-wide growth of Anglo-Saxon nativism, whose activities mirrored the history of popular xenophobia, tended to corrode the traditional American confidence in assimilation and homogeneity.⁸ Prewar sentiment, surrounded by myth and emotionalism, left the American people psychologically unprepared to achieve national solidarity. The German invasion of Belgium strengthened nativist sentiment and opened wide cleavages along nationalist lines. As Merle Curti has observed, "Hatred of the enemy across the sea was extended to German-Americans at home in the name of loyalty to the nation."⁹ The use of the German language was forbidden in the pulpits and schools of Montana. In Iowa, the governor ruled that German could not be used on street cars, over the telephone, or anywhere else in public.¹⁰ Even before America's entry into the war, there had been attacks upon things German. After Wilson's decision to intervene, the cries of hate rose to a crescendo. As two historians have pointed out, "Names of towns and individuals were changed. The lowly hamburger became the liberty sandwich, and sauerkraut was called liberty cabbage. Hymns, symphonies, and operas of German origin

⁵ Henry Pratt Fairchild, "The Melting-Pot Mistake," in *Immigration; an American dilemma*, ed. Benjamin Munn Ziegler, Boston, 1953, 23-25.

⁶ Jacob A. Riis, *How the Other Half Lives*, New York, 1957, 15.

⁷ John Tracy Ellis, *American Catholicism*, Chicago, 1955, 101.

⁸ John Higham, *Strangers in the Land; Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925*, New Brunswick, N. J., 1955, 183.

⁹ Merle Curti, *The Roots of American Loyalty*, New York, 1946, 227.

¹⁰ H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, *Opponents of War, 1917-1918*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1957, 195-196.

were looked upon with suspicion. And then, of course, there was hatred of the German language."¹¹

From press surveys it appears that of 367 American newspapers, 105 favored the Allies and 20 the German cause. The other 242 were neutral. Community sympathies were given as pro-Ally in 189 cases, pro-German in 38, and 140 divided. In both cases, the Middle West was more favorable toward the German cause than the East or the South.¹² American intervention, itself a product of political, economic, and cultural forces, showed evidence of the weight of ethnic loyalties, not least so in the case of President Wilson himself. Even before 1917, the question of participation had already aligned factions into respective camps who fought to determine the course of national policy. As one eminent American historian has said, "The conflict that ensued brought to the fore questions of the nature of group loyalties that, until then, had largely been taken for granted."¹³ This division of group loyalties would seem to have insured the success of German propaganda. But, much to the chagrin of its agents, the American "melting pot" continued to function despite the division in national loyalty.

Since the atmosphere in the United States "made it impossible to risk exacerbating public opinion by any acts of sabotage,"¹⁴ the representatives of Germany in the United States did what they could to organize an information service to present the German point of view to the American public. A propaganda committee was formed with the support of a number of German organizations and of the German language press.¹⁵ A German propaganda mission headed by Dr. Heinrich Albert and Dr. Bernhard Dernburg arrived in the United States shortly after the outbreak of war, and the German government opened an information bureau on Broadway, in New York City. From this office came press releases, interviews, lectures, movies, and other devices to mold public opinion in favor of the Central Powers. "German propagandists," says Carl Wittke, "supported pacifist and antiwar organizations, worked closely with the Irish, bought the New York Daily Mail, and distributed news reports favorable to Germany to the American press."¹⁶

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 195.

¹² William P. Slosson, *The Great Crusade and After: 1914-1928*, New York, 1930, 10-11.

¹³ Oscar Handlin, *The American People in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge, 1954, 113.

¹⁴ Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, London, 1952, 36.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 32-33.

¹⁶ Carl Wittke, *The German-Language Press in the United States*, Lexington, Ky., 1957, 238.

The columns of the German-American press were opened to the consuls of the German government stationed in the United States, "and these officials availed themselves of this vehicle in order to publish not only official communications to German citizens, resident in the United States, but also to communicate on the war."¹⁷ Another instrument of German propaganda was the public lecture platform. Professor Eugen Kühnemann, an exchange professor from the University of Breslau who had lectured at Harvard and Wisconsin, and was still in the United States, "was converted into public lecturer" whose duty it was to travel all over the country making public addresses on the causes and issues of the war.¹⁸

We must make a distinction here between the German-language press and propagandist instruments subsidized by the German government solely for the use of propaganda purposes. That the German-language press and the German element was "pro-German during the first three years of the war was to be expected, and during the period of American neutrality, "it was just as legal and reasonable to be pro-German as it was to be pro-Ally."¹⁹ That many Germans, in their desire to refute slanderous accusations—especially in view of the tendency to canonize the Allies in the United States—"occasionally overstepped the bounds of discretion and common sense is also quite understandable."²⁰

There is also evidence that propagandists from Germany received considerable cooperation from the various branches of the German-American Alliance, a defense organization representing more than a million and a half members.²¹ The German-American Alliance was never really understood in Germany. Absurd comments upon its activities in the German press, and extravagant claims as to its political power, "managed to do considerable harm when they found their way (often via London) into the United States."²² Commenting upon the June 8, 1916 edition of the *Chicago Abendpost* (which openly admitted the activist tendencies of the National German-American Alliance) a critic of the Alliance stated that the propaganda was directed against the prevailing

¹⁷ Carl Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, Columbus, Ohio, 1936, 9.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹⁹ Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America*, New York, 1939, 259-260.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 260. See also Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 12.

²¹ Clifton James Child, *The German-Americans in Politics 1914-1917*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1939, 30.

²² *Ibid.*, 177.

Anglo-Saxon culture; its mission, according to the Baltimore *Deutsche Correspondent*, was that of "preventing the now incipient Anglicizing of the American people, of seeing that the race of men issuing from the melting-pot be no Anglo-Saxon, but a purely American race [Germanoriented, to be sure] having its own history, its own politics, its own culture, its own philosophy of life, its own way of thinking and feeling."²³ At the beginning of 1915 there was talk of establishing a daily newspaper in the English language. However, Charles L. Hexamer, the president of the National German-American Alliance, had already expressed satisfaction (on the part of the Alliance) with George Sylvester Viereck's English weekly, *The Fatherland*.²⁴ Indeed, Hexamer's position was well taken, for *The Fatherland* was probably the most important and effective instrument for the spread of German propaganda in the United States.

George Sylvester Viereck was a devoted worker in the German propaganda movement.²⁵ His English weekly *The Fatherland*, "became perhaps the most outspoken German propaganda sheet in America." As one of the few papers which received financial aid from the German Government, it built up a large circulation among the German-American element. Some of the German-language papers frankly admitted that *The Fatherland* was subsidized by the German Government and "saw no reason to apologize for this arrangement."²⁶ A letter from Alexander Konta to Dr. Bernhard Dernburg in March, 1915, is one of the earliest records explaining the purpose of this weekly. The weekly, said Konta, would be "a discreet appeal to every German society in the country for support by its members." A national daily circulation of 500,000 copies would tremendously impress the man in the street. "Politically, the transaction would have to be handled with the utmost delicacy. No suspicion of the influence behind it should be allowed to reach the public."²⁷ If zeal and devotedness are any criteria, then Viereck and his *Fatherland* were more than equal to the task.

The immediate task of *The Fatherland* was to explain away the German invasion of Belgium. Germany's situation in regard

²³ Frank Perry Olds, "Kultur in American Politics," *Atlantic Monthly* (September, 1916), 383-384.

²⁴ Child, *German-Americans in Politics*, 29.

²⁵ Walter Millis, *Road to War*, New York, 1935, 207.

²⁶ Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 23.

²⁷ Slosson, *The Great Crusade*, 6-7.

to Belgium, said Viereck, was "that of a young giant surrounded on all sides by an impregnable iron wall and having through the one side an easy means of escape."²⁸ Before the war there had already existed, without any cause from the German side, a fanatical hatred in Belgium for the Germans. Belgium had already been mobilized. Moreover, continued *The Fatherland*, "the most unbelievable persecutions of Germans had taken place, women and children were killed by the most cruel tortures, in a way only thought possible at the Congo in the darkest of Africa, perhaps, but never in Europe."²⁹ Today, said the propaganda sheet, we know the cause of it. An agreement existed between England, France, and Belgium to attack Germany by way of Belgium. Hence, Belgium "had to pay for it."³⁰ Indeed, to support this claim, *The Fatherland* reported the discovery of important documents in the archives of the Belgium General Staff, revealing conclusively that Belgium was a designing party to a preconcerted conspiracy to crush Germany. The plan, of English origin, and sanctioned by Lieutenant-General James Griers, Chief of the British General Staff, set in motion an expeditionary force of 100,000 men to invade Germany. From these official documents, said Viereck, "it requires a peculiarly warped mental attitude to gather the conclusion that Belgium was not hand-in-glove with England and France in a colossal conspiracy to destroy the German Empire."³¹

It is highly significant that *The Fatherland* mitigated this belligerent attitude concerning the Belgium invasion, for it indicates the difficulty that Viereck had in equating the violation of Belgium's neutrality with the traditional American abhorrence of militarism and treaty violation. Germany's position must be understood, pleaded *The Fatherland* in 1917. She had always fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; and, if such a war occurred, it would be a matter of life and death. "Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In the face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do."³² The invasion of Belgium, then, was a matter of defense.³³ Since Germany's

²⁸ *The Fatherland*, September 30, 1914, vol. I, no. 8, p. 5.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, September 14, 1914, vol. I, no. 6, p. 2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 7; December 30, 1914, vol. I, no. 21, p. 14.

³¹ *Ibid.*, November 4, 1914, vol. I, no. 13, pp. 10-11.

³² *Ibid.*, January 17, 1917, vol. V, no. 24, p. 395.

³³ Hugo Münsterberg, *The War and America*, New York, 1914, 8-9. See also *The Fatherland*, November 29, 1916, vol. V, no. 17, p. 263.

neighbors begrudged the prosperity of *The Fatherland*, which resulted from the development of her agricultural and industrial resources, "Germany had to spend a vast part of its material and mental income in a hard preparation for defense."³⁴ As a counter to the Belgium atrocity stories, *The Fatherland* told its readers of 1620 murders committed by the Russians in East Prussia simply from "the bestial lust of blood and torture."³⁵ Such brutality, continued the weekly, was a decided difference from the "restraint" which the Germans always exercised.

Despite this attempt to convince non-Germans that the Belgium invasion was a defensive measure, little or no success was gained in this direction. It offended American sensibilities in areas of thought. Progressivism, the prevailing body of social thought in the formative years of the twentieth century, ran counter to the defensive theme expressed by German propagandists. As a collection of loosely connected and not always consistent ideas, progressivism shared the belief in social legislation, the extension of political democracy, and the restoration of individual rights.³⁶ Not least important in the philosophy of progressivism was the belief in a fundamental moral law. The invasion of neutral Belgium, with its corollary, the doctrine of a "scrap of paper," violated a sacred obligation. To deny that contracts are sacred was to deny the ruling philosophy of America. Moreover, the invasion of Belgium came at a time when the moral law was being much emphasized in American social ideas. It had provided the background for the Progressive crusaders who were seeking to overcome the evils of capitalism and political corruption. "In such an age, when hope in a new and better day ran high the invasion of Belgium seemed to be denial of morality and a reversion toward some new dark age."³⁷

Behind the appeal to the defensive theme stressed by German propagandists lay the assumption that a nation must make its decisions wholly upon the basis of what it considers to be its best interests. If a nation's activities cannot be restrained by a moral law, the nation in fact must be a law unto itself.³⁸ Secondly, the invasion of Belgium offended, however inconsistent, the traditional

³⁴ Münsterberg, *The War and America*, pp. 4-5. See also Hugo Münsterberg, *The Peace and America*, New York, 1915, 181.

³⁵ *The Fatherland*, August 23, 1916, vol. V, no. 3, p. 36.

³⁶ Merle Curti *The Growth of American Thought*, 2nd Ed., New York, 1951, 623.

³⁷ Ralph H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, New York, 1956, 391-392.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 391.

American suspicion of militarism and things military. Such a suspicion was observed as early as the eighteenth century by the French historian, Alexis de Tocqueville.³⁹ Some indication of the strength of this anti-militarist feeling may be seen by the difficulty which the "preparedness" movement encountered. The two chief champions of the movement, in its early stages, General Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt, won the day only through skillful leadership, ample financial backing, and the glamour of parades.⁴⁰ Evidence exists which shows that Viereck was cognizant of this failure, because he hastily revised the Belgium theme and redirected it toward the German-American element.

The die is cast, said *The Fatherland*; the most highly cultured people of all times are engaged in a death struggle with jealous and semi-barbaric foes. The death struggle between the Slav and the Teuton is not merely a struggle for territory or commercial supremacy as many superficial observers seem to believe, but a conflict of principles, "a struggle ultimately of the highest ideals known to the human race against the low and sordid aims of races merely veneered with culture."⁴¹ Europe, then, was not waging a war against German imperialism, but against German culture; and it was perfectly plain to *The Fatherland* that German culture depended upon her military power. "Were it not for German militarism, German civilization would long since have been extirpated. For its protection it arose in a land which for centuries had been plagued by bands of robbers, as no other land had been."⁴² The real causes for the war lay in the fact that England, "a nation of shop keepers," worshipped the god of materialism, while Germany steadily adhered to its ancient veneration of the eternal values of life. Consequently, "it should be the sacred duty of all thinking men to do everything possible to prevent the crippling or the downfall of the German Empire . . . in the interest of higher civilization . . . so that a world catastrophe may still be prevented."⁴³ The destruction of the German people

³⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Oxford ed., London, 1953, 527.

⁴⁰ George E. Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, Madison, Wisconsin, 1947, 304-316; John M. Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt*, Cambridge, 1954, 155. For contemporary observations on Theodore Roosevelt and "preparedness," see *The Autobiography of William Allen White*, New York, 1946, 507.

⁴¹ *The Fatherland*, August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 7.

⁴² *Ibid.*, November 11, 1914, vol. I, no. 14, p. 4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, August 31, 1914, vol. I, no. 4, pp. 6-7.

would be a return to the Dark Ages—to a civilization that makes material values end in themselves.

All Europe except Germany has been steadily sinking to a plane of crass materialism, which has been resisted successfully in the Fatherland by the vehement warnings of the best of the nation. In the case of England and France the degeneration has been so thorough-going that certain of their pseudo statesmen has [sic] betrayed Western culture to the Oriental. Germany may finally succumb, for she stands at bay to a yelling pack determined on her destruction. . . . Idealistic Germany, conscious of being the standard bearer of values that might easily be lost forever to civilization, could never tamely submit to become like, effeminate Italy, merely a Niobe of culture. Hence, no true friend of culture can view with approval or indifference the unparalleled crime against civilization involved in this ruthless advance of the Slav on the Teuton. The only ray of hope in the present emergency lies in the complete preparation of the powerful German nations for the struggle.⁴⁴

The corollary to this defense-of-culture theme was usually a critical appraisal of American foreign policy, stressing American intervention in Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. History was used to equate the American seizure of California and Texas with the Belgium invasion. "In this respect," said *The Fatherland*, "the American eagle differs not a whit from the German eagle."⁴⁵

The failure, of course, with this phase of German propaganda, was the fact that it was based upon the cultural forces prevalent in the *older* immigration. Until 1850 the German immigrants had taken the political and economic freedom of the country for granted.⁴⁶ To be sure, the early German immigrant had every intention of retaining Old-World customs and traditions.⁴⁷ But after 1850, a new type of German immigrant appeared on the American scene. The "forty-eighters" came to the United States after the collapse of the German revolution. They soon became caught up in the absorbent powers of the new land, and quickly began to integrate themselves into the realities of American life. "At no other period did America receive a wave of immigrants with so much political consciousness and idealism."⁴⁸ Thus, the

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, loc. cit., 7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 59.

⁴⁶ Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration; 1607-1860*, Cambridge, 1951, 148-149.

⁴⁷ Albert B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States*, 2 vols., New York, 1909, vol. II, 377-475.

⁴⁸ Dieter Cunz, "The German-Americans: Immigration and Integration," *Twenty-eighth Report of the Society for the History of the Germans in Maryland*, Baltimore, 1953, 33.

new type of immigrant was more interested in social legislation, prohibition, woman's suffrage, and civil service reform, rather than directing all his energies to the strengthening of cultural bonds with the Fatherland.

The most colossal blunder committed by *The Fatherland*, however, was the condemnation of British materialism and the consequent exaltation of Germany's adherence to the development of the "higher life." The naturalized voter might be without funds or land, he might inhabit a slum tenement, but no matter how miserable his surroundings he was a capitalist at heart. As the foremost historian of American immigration has observed, "The hope that brought him across the Atlantic did not fail him; and the possession by others of wealth and leisure spurred him on to secure the same advantages for himself and his children."⁴⁹ The German immigrant never questioned the fundamentals of capitalism. He was a man of enterprise, determined to reap the harvest of a free economy. In short, he was more anxious to emulate American capitalists than to preserve the philosophy of Goethe or the music of Wagner.

Another avenue of attack used by German propagandists was a skillful exploitation of American colonial history and traditional anti-British sentiment. *The Fatherland* was careful to point out that British propaganda emanated from a "Tory" press. Even the new edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica was denounced as "a distorted, insular, incomplete and aggressively British reference work, the use of which constituted a fatal intellectual danger to America."⁵⁰ Charles J. Hexamer, president of the National German-American Alliance, declared that the American nation should burn the Declaration of Independence as well as the Constitution. What was needed was, "a new Declaration of Independence of the American Press against the yoke of international English news service and against the dictation of England in our editorial sanctums."⁵¹ The readers of *The Fatherland* were reminded that they were more completely under the domination of England than at any time since the Revolution, and practices which led to the War of 1812 were acquiesced in by the State Department.⁵² *The Fatherland* stressed repeatedly the fact that America had rebelled

⁴⁹ Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History*, Cambridge, 1948, 85.

⁵⁰ Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 12.

⁵¹ *The Fatherland*, November 11, 1914, vol. I, no. 14, p. 7.

⁵² *Ibid.*, December 9, 1914, vol. I, no. 18, p. 9.

against England and not Germany. It was England who had flirted with the Southern Confederacy and attempted to ignore the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. Even in the Spanish-American War public opinion in England was bitter against the United States.⁵³ When England barred the International News Service and refused the latter both mail and cable facilities for news dispatches to America, *The Fatherland* exploited the American worship of a free press. This stupidity of the British, it said, "will lead to a new Declaration of Independence from Great Britain."⁵⁴ The most extravagant encomiums, of course, were reserved for the Revolutionary leaders.

A recurrent theme was that George Washington fought the same enemy against whom Germany was now fighting—an enemy who wantonly attacked the United States in 1812 and who looted and burned the White House. Washington, continued *The Fatherland*, along with many other patriots of the American Revolution, like Steuben, Muhlenberg, Herkimer, and Count von Wittgenstein, fought against the enemy who is Germany's enemy today. "Would George Washington, would Abraham Lincoln be found on the side of England against Germany, if they were alive today?" concluded the weekly.⁵⁵ *The Fatherland* further recalled to its readers that it had been Frederick the Great who had "alone recognized the United States of America as entitled to a place in the family of independent nations."⁵⁶ The speech of James Madison, made in June of 1812, in which he condemned Great Britain for interfering with the rights of American commerce and navigation led *The Fatherland* to comment that Great Britain was the same in 1916 as she was in 1812. "It is deplorable," continued the article, "that we do not have more of the Americans with red blood in their veins like President Madison today."⁵⁷

The presidential campaign of 1916 was especially fertile for this exploitation of the Revolutionary War. The real interests and issues of the campaign had been side-stepped, declared *The Fatherland*. How much longer will we permit the British to blacklist our merchants, loot our mails and blockade our commerce with

⁵³ *Ibid.*, October 28, 1914, vol. I, no. 12, p. 8; November 25, 1915, vol. I, no. 16, p. 11; November 1, 1916, vol. V, no. 13, p. 194; October 25, 1916, vol. V, no. 12, p. 186.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, October 25, 1916, vol. V, no. 12, p. 186.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, December 30, 1914, vol. I, no. 21, p. 11.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, November 4, 1914, vol. I, no. 13, p. 6; August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 10.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, November 1, 1916, vol. V, no. 13, p. 198.

neutral countries? it asked. But for the struggle of Americans of German descent to arouse the "spirit of '76," these issues would seem to have been as "dead as the mummy of Cleopatra." It was the "Minute Men" of 1916, added *The Fatherland*, who were struggling gallantly to uproot the British conspiracy and keep the real issues in the open.⁵⁸ Even the British, said the weekly, were beginning to realize that the opposition of the German-Americans "with sterling Americans of other stock in whom the spirit of 1776 still survives blasts her last hope of dragging the United States into the war on the side of the Allies."⁵⁹ Along with this latter theme usually went a praise for the famous German-American politician Carl Schurz and his emphasis on neutrality and avoidance of European conflicts.⁶⁰ The irony in this line of attack by the German propagandists lay in the fact that it appealed to a heritage in which the first generation had no part, and which was only dimly apparent to the second. Surely, Americanization was well under way, even though language and community customs were slow in disappearing. Clearly, the Revolutionary philosophy and the "spirit of '76" would appeal to a much later group of immigrants' descendents.

A more vigorous theme used by *The Fatherland* was the identification of Wall Street and England with a world-wide conspiracy to subvert American ideals. The war, said Viereck, benefited no one except England and Wall Street.⁶¹ The attack usually centered on J. P. Morgan,⁶² Elihu Root, and George H. Putnam. "Let it be remembered," said *The Fatherland*, "that Root and his Allies are seeking to carry out the terms of the secret treaty between this country and England. . . . Root and his Confederates are trying to deliver the United States bound hand in foot into the keeping of England."⁶³ For *The Fatherland*, the conspiracy motif could serve both in domestic and international politics which happened to be unfavorable to the course advocated by Viereck. Thus, New York City was described as a scene of a terrific war between

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, November 8, 1916, vol. V, no. 14, p. 218; August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 58.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, October 18, 1916, vol. V, no. 11, pp. 170-171.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, September 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 8, p. 118; October 18, 1916, vol. V, no. 11, p. 170.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, February 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 2, p. 26.

⁶² *Ibid.*, August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 6.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, December 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 21, p. 329; August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 53; August 16, 1916, vol. V, no. 2, p. 21; March 7, 1917, vol. VI, no. 5, p. 73; February 14, 1917, vol. VI no. 2, p. 26.

capital and labor. The Wall Street banking group was portrayed as seeking to crush unionism as it sought to involve the United States into war with Germany.⁶⁴ When Woodrow Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, Viereck urged his readers "who refuse to participate in the desperate conspiracy hatched in London" to write to the President and urge neutrality.⁶⁵ A German should never forget, explained *The Fatherland*, that the United States was ruled from London.⁶⁶

Again, it is apparent that German propaganda had failed to advance with the growth of American political thought. The conspiracy theme had been much used by the agrarian Populists of the 1890's, many of whom actually believed in a vast conspiracy of a financial group operating between London and Wall Street.⁶⁷ But by 1914, the philosophy of Populism was moribund. The advent of Wilson's "New Freedom" meant the rooting out of all evil within finance capitalism—hence, Wilson's trust busting. For the German propagandists to have centered their artillery on such a *réchauffé* of past agrarian contentions as an international economic "conspiracy" betokened their vast ignorance of the fact the Progressivism had done much to re-establish free enterprise.⁶⁸

An even more difficult obstacle for German propaganda to overcome was the common American belief that Germany's political system was undemocratic. *The Fatherland* attempted to obviate this ideological stumbling block by attacking not only the two American political parties,⁶⁹ but by criticizing the theoretical foundations of the American political system as well. America's political system was called "the worst and clumsiest system in the world."⁷⁰ On the other hand, said Viereck, the war had realtered the internal life of Germany, as expressed in her political parties. The Conservative, Liberal, and Social Democratic parties were described as being in a state of evolution, ushering in progressive forces, so that when peace returned, "a liberal reconstruction of national life" was anticipated for a new democratic, and free Germany.⁷¹ What

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, September 20, 1916, vol. V, no. 7, p. 102.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, February 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 2, p. 19; September 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 8, p. 122.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, August 31, 1914, vol. I, no. 4, pp. 4-5.

⁶⁷ Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, New York, 1955, 73-74.

⁶⁸ Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era: 1910-1917*, New York, 1954, chap. IX, *passim*.

⁶⁹ *The Fatherland*, March 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 6, p. 83.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, December 13, 1916, vol. V, no. 19, p. 298.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, April 25, 1917, vol. VI, no. 12, pp. 196-197.

was the secret of Germany's progress? asked *The Fatherland*. The answer, instinctively known to every true German, was simply that in the Fatherland the will of the people was instantly ascertained and put into action by a single, responsible government. The United States, continued Viereck, had already experimented with the same governmental principle without realizing that it was the very principle making for German progress. This system, continued *The Fatherland*, had no name, but could be called a "polyocracy." Because of its complexity, this system was imperfectly understood even by the German people. Thus, according to *The Fatherland*, the German Empire was not a monarchy but a confederation. The Kaiser was nothing more than "a psychological emperor, and not a real emperor."⁷² In reality, the German Empire was a Republic, with its real power located in the will of the people as represented by the Bundesrat. The Kaiser actually had very little power.

This misapprehension of his real position is the source of much error in judging Germany's relations to the country. Bismarck, too, looms much larger in America than he does in Germany, while the Bundesrat, the true power of the empire, is only known as a legislative term.⁷³

The secret, then, of German progress was to be found in the powers of the Bundesrat, in which were united the executive, legislative, and judicial functions. The American government could benefit if it too would establish a Bundesrat. Such a system was vastly superior to the American system because the will of the people was always carried out. "In short, the Bundesrat system may be termed a polyocracy, or a government of the many. Essentially, it is an aristocracy on good behavior, an aristocracy holding its job at the pleasure of a democracy."⁷⁴

This attempt to dispel the charges of an undemocratic government characterized by the autocratic will of the Kaiser had little effect on the German-Americans. There were various causes for Old-World emigration, and, certainly, the political factor cannot be denied. But the freedom sought by the immigrant was primarily economic freedom. The aspiration of the rank and file of immigrants was to take advantage of the opportunities of free enterprise and, in turn, to preserve the fruits of such an economic system. Hence, the political system they found in America (which operated so as to ensure the continuance of the *economic* system) was the

⁷² *Ibid.*, January 13, 1915, vol. I, no. 23, pp. 6-9.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, loc. cit., 9.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, January 20, 1915, vol. I, no. 25, pp. 8-9.

one they wished to embrace. As a result, the weight of immigrant political influence had been felt on the side of conservatism. They had little desire to level down the gradations of society. Usually, they were democrats, but only in the sense that "they believed that the American brand of government would facilitate the acquisition of property and position and would protect them in what they had acquired."⁷⁵ Thus, the immigrant was quite satisfied with the American political system as he found it and had little desire to change its form.

Various other devices were used by *The Fatherland* to further the German cause. Germany was pointed to as a great humanitarian state, and the work of Dr. Rudoff Veretow in pathology was used again and again to exemplify Germany's altruism.⁷⁶ Germany was portrayed as the champion of humanity, a champion who believed in the "ethical justification of a sacred war."⁷⁷ To a religious nation, *The Fatherland* declared that next to the United States "the Church in Germany has made the greatest progress in modern times."⁷⁸ When an explosion destroyed an estimated \$7,000,000 worth of munitions in New York Harbor, *The Fatherland* was disposed to see "the Hand of God" in the affair. It was significant, said the weekly, that the force of the explosion shattered every window in the bombproof office of J. P. Morgan. Nor was it without importance that the schrapnel from the explosion "severely shook the Statue of Liberty to its very foundations."⁷⁹ In defense of the German submarine attacks on American commerce, *The Fatherland* revealed that the English had employed Americans to sail on English vessels for \$27.50 a month.⁸⁰ Moreover, *The Fatherland* recalled, during the War of 1812 the British "hand-sank" American shipping, disregarding international law.⁸¹ Finally, the German submarine was pictured as actually helping American commerce, for it was destroying English commercial supremacy. Thus, the German U-boat was likened to the Southern parasite, "in that slowly and inexorably it has consumed the strength of Britain's economic fabric."⁸² However, the most important of all propaganda efforts

⁷⁵ Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History*, 80-82.

⁷⁶ *The Fatherland*, August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 6-7; September 6, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 67.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, September 23, 1914, vol. I, no. 7, p. 14.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, November 25, 1914, vol. I, no. 16, p. 8.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 10.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, November 8, 1916, vol. V, no. 14, p. 216.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, September 6, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 71.

⁸² *Ibid.*, September 13, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 83. See also August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 51, and August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 9.

was that of furthering the cleavage between the immigrant groups and native Americans.⁸³

The German-American, said *The Fatherland*, looked upon Germany as his mother and America as his bride. Consequently, he was as proud of his mother as he was of his bride. "His attitude toward his bride is not determined by the demands of his mother."⁸⁴ German propaganda thus concentrated on exploiting the cultural ties between the German-American and his forefathers in the Old World. "I can assure you," said *The Fatherland*, "that the German cause can be greatly assisted in other countries, especially in America, if one always proudly acknowledges one's German sentiments, supports the German ideal of culture, and especially promotes the preservation of the German language."⁸⁵

On his trip abroad in 1916, Louis Viereck, the staff correspondent, commented on the similarity between Austrians in Europe and the Germans in America. Even the region of the Danube reminded him of the Mississippi basin. His argument seemed to be that, after all, the Germans in Europe and America were members of the same race, and had preserved their language and national traits. Moreover, in addition to the common language and customs, the Lutheran church bound the German-Americans to their mother country. "As good Hungarian citizens, as the Saxons undoubtedly are, they will never let any one rob them of their traditional German traits, as well as German customs *to be found all over the world*."⁸⁶ The implications of this propaganda are obvious. Like the "good Hungarian citizens," the German-American should not have abandoned his nationality, let alone his customs and language.

The duty of the German-American was elaborated by the National German-American Alliance at the Washington conference of January 30, 1915. It was said that evidently it was "the mission of the German-Americans to bring their adopted country, misled and misrepresented by its newspapers, back to authentic Americanism."⁸⁷ Consequently, the duty of the German-American was to make himself a factor in the United States.⁸⁸ German-American sympathizers were encouraged to organize and to send speakers to every city and town. Local German societies were advised to rent theaters and

⁸³ von Papen, *Memoirs*, 35.

⁸⁴ *The Fatherland*, October 18, 1916, vol. V, no. 11, p. 164.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, November 18, 1914, vol. I, no. 15, pp. 11-12.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, December 6, 1916, vol. V, no. 18, pp. 277-278.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, February 10, 1915, vol. II, no. 1, pp. 10-11; December 2, 1914, vol. I, no. 17, p. 5.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, November 18, 1914, vol. I, no. 15, p. 14.

hire speakers to "counteract the influence of the English press." The American people should be "educated" to the true causes and meaning of the war. "Organize," warned *The Fatherland*, "before it is too late."⁸⁹ Pamphlets should be circulated for distribution. Singlehanded, little could be accomplished, said *The Fatherland*; but, by uniting local associations the sympathizers of Germany could exercise the balance of power and bring the American people to their senses.⁹⁰ The national consciousness of the Germans in the United States, said *The Fatherland*, was one of the most significant results of the war. The latest sign was the founding of the German Glee Club at Cornell University. This Glee Club, said the weekly, "has now become the nucleus of an intense German spirit," and it urged the movement to spread to other universities.⁹¹ *The Fatherland*, however, was more interested in the immigrant groups.

For the benefit of the Irish immigrants, *The Fatherland* declared that Germany would not give up Belgium until England relinquished Ireland.⁹² Germany's chief aim in the war was the freedom of the seas, and this freedom depended on the deliberation of Ireland. *The Fatherland*, continued the weekly, did not discover the plight of Ireland until 1913; consequently, she could not come to an understanding with England until the fate of Ireland was settled. If the Irish Revolution should ever break out again, Germany would not only recognize Ireland's independence but would also send money and men. But, more important, the Irish struggle was of special significance to the German-Americans because "if Germany were crushed, the hopes of Ireland would be crushed likewise."

If Ireland remained in fetters, our hopes for Germany would be blighted. We are one with the Irish. The Irish are one with us. . . . *The Fatherland* and its readers feel that the cause of the Central Powers and the cause of Irish freedom are one.⁹³

Even the Jewish element was not ignored. *The Fatherland* reminded its Jewish readers that the Russian Czar had taken justice, law, and property away from his Jewish population. On the other hand, in Germany, the Jew had been accorded every privilege and right offered to Christians. One thing was certain, said *The Fatherland*, and that was that "the Jews throughout the world are a unit

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, September 23, 1914, vol. I, no. 7, p. 10.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, January 27, 1915, vol. I, no. 25, p. 3; November 25, 1914, vol. I, no. 16, p. 9.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, December 16, 1914, vol. I, no. 19, p. 7.

⁹² *Ibid.*, December 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 21, pp. 346-347.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, October 4, 1914, vol. V, no. 9, p. 138; August 16, 1916, vol. V, no. 2, p. 26.

in their opposition to Russia."⁹⁴ *The Fatherland* hoped, therefore, that by appealing to the ethnic loyalties of the Irish and the Jews it could create a unified pressure group within the United States, unfavorable to the Allied cause.

The futility of this attempt to solidify the immigrant elements in the United States lay, of course, in the belief held by the German propagandists that the German, Irish, and Jewish immigrants were similar to "the good citizens" of German descent in Hungary. Despite, however, the antagonism between the immigrants and a certain element of native Americans, the "melting pot" continued to function. The American offspring of the older generation turned their once powerful group-consciousness into more nationalistic channels. The sons of the immigrants had no memory of Old-World places, causes, or of village solidarity. The old affiliations of the German, Irish, and Jewish immigrants had no meaning for this second generation, save as a kind of patriotism. Gradually, traditional customs were lost; the lines in the immigrant press concerning village life slowly faded, then disappeared completely, replaced by news of the immigrant's new home. Parents found it more convenient to send their children to public schools. The immigrant theatre also vanished from the American scene, irretrievably supplanted by the new (and national) medium of the motion picture.

Thus, in these, and in numerous other ways the immigrants were adjusting to the American environment as the American environment was, in turn, growing accustomed to their presence. This assimilative process which the immigrants experienced has been well analyzed by Oscar Handlin:

The old coat disintegrates. Its rugged homespun had come along; its solid virtues had taken the strain of the full way since the old tailor had put his labored stitches into it. The new is one of many, indistinguishable from the rest. Cheaper, it transforms the wearer; coming out the factory gate he is now also one of many, indistinguishable from the rest.⁹⁵

Thus, the ultimate failure of German propaganda was the failure to recognize the influence of the American "melting pot" and its ability to assimilate the one into many.

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⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 14; September 6, 1914, vol. I, no. 5, p. 3; September 14, 1914, vol. I, no. 6, p. 11.

⁹⁵ Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted*, New York, 1951, 196-197.

Book Reviews

Gabriel Richard, Frontier Ambassador. By Frank B. Woodford and Albert Hyma. Detroit (Wayne State University Press), 1958. Pp. xxviii, 160. Illustrated. \$4.50.

This work of two distinguished scholars is certainly refreshing among the biographies of American clerics. In fact the reviewer would like to nominate it for a Pulitzer Prize. Professors Woodford and Hyma summoned their highest gifts to produce a model of the art of historiography. The assembling and marshalling of materials matches a writer craftsmanship of high quality. In the approach, and preceptivity of judgment both as to episode and to overall location of the subject, a discerning reader will discover both a story of moment and an ornament to the most demanding library. Striking are the pains taken for exactness, sharp delineation, absolute fairness, and full appreciation of genuine worth.

Gabriel Richard played a part of no small measure in building our early Northwest. Author opinion has it this way: "Of all the pioneers [of Michigan], he is, perhaps, the best remembered; certainly the most beloved." Born in the Gironde of France in 1767, Richard emerged into manhood and priesthood as the Revolution lit the twin flames of ardor and passion. Not by his choice—for he would gladly have gone down with other heroes—but at the direction of his Sulpician superiors, he took ship at Honfleur on April 9, 1792, to follow his predecessor missionaries of the preceding centuries. For the next forty years he would fulfill his title of "Frontier Ambassador."

A scholar himself, self-destined for professional life, he found his first situation in the area recently won by George Rogers Clark. In 1798 Bishop Carroll ordered him to the Detroit region, his headquarters from then onward in the dual apostolate of pastor and maker of a society. In both he served with spotless sacerdotal reputation, though he twice knew what is meant to look out from behind the bars, once as a locked-up enemy of the British in the War of 1812, again as a priest convicted for doing his duty in publicly ousting a member of his congregation for notorious marital infidelity. No short account can do justice to his contribution in the making of America, nor explain his enduring honor among his people.

For long the only clergyman in the entire territory between Lake Huron and the Mississippi, he did his religious duty almost as a matter of course. Every Sunday for years he lectured to large groups of people outside his own faith. Schools were to him the basis for both heaven and earth. There he generated the parochial system and the district public system. He is honored as co-founder and—for years—teacher, and vice-president of the legally organized university of Michigan, at first called by his co-worker, Representative Woodbridge, the "Catholepistemiad." In the fire of 1805 that wiped out the little city, he led the forces that saved the people and restored the municipality. When war came he stoutly refused foreign allegiance. Facing Indian threats, he won over the Redman to friendship by help in trouble and by his schools and priestly dedication. The university story in itself is a saga of understanding and energy.

When in 1823 he broke down his distaste and agreed to run for election as Delegate to Congress, his motive was to unite the French settlers or *Canadiens* with the westward-moving frontier. In that campaign he learned how unfair competitors can be, but he held to his aim and won such benefits as land-distribution and construction of important roads, particularly over the old Sauk trail to Chicago. The Labadie incident caused him great unhappiness, but again he stuck to justice and constitutional principle and preferred jail to paying damages assessed at the instance of a famous name that quit his parish in a pique. Denied the bishopric, though it had been at first awarded by papal decision, he refused to stop his forward motion, and his last service for the cholera-stricken populace brought him to death on September 13, 1832.

The printers have given Richard a highly artistic setting. A large page, seven by ten, set with Linotype Granjon and Bulmer Display faces, and an imposing group of engravings and other illustrative material done in offset, present the reader with a gem of typography. Bibliographical citations will attract a student to go further in this revealing narrative. The index is meticulous, and thorough. And, for one who wants to know where he is as the story moves along, good maps identify each central topic of geography.

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From Community to Metropolis. A Biography of São Paulo, Brazil. By Richard M. Morse. University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1958. Pp. xxiii, 341. Illustrated. \$7.50.

This is an elaborated, English version of Professor Morse's study published in Portuguese translation in 1954 for the occasion of the fourth centennial celebration of the founding of São Paulo. The author began his work in Brazil in 1947 and after long research concludes that "the fastest growing city in the world" should not be called "the Chicago of South America" nor even likened to Chicago except in some very superficial aspects. Despite its remarkable growth in population to more than 3,000,000, its dynamic progress in building, and its leadership in industry in all Latin America, São Paulo is different from all other cities from a sociological viewpoint, while in spirit it has emerged as a nucleated metropolis, fundamentally agrarian and patriarchal, with a distinctive culture that can be characterized only as Paulista.

To arrive at his major conclusion Dr. Morse had to reach many minor conclusions, twenty-one, to be exact, which became the subjects of the twenty-one chapters and the reasons why São Paulo is so different. Such individual studies required an enormous amount of reading to gather evidence for his verdict. The evidence is generously quoted in the text and summarized in a selective bibliography of thirty-two pages chiefly of source materials. Besides the written authorities Dr. Morse calls upon his own observations and conversations with the city's leaders in his effort to comprehend their minds and aims. All the research was done according to pattern to discover why such great industrial and cultural progress could

have been made by the metropolis "within a plantation economy, within a Roman Catholic, patriarchal, and tradition-bound culture, and in a country indifferently blessed with the resources for industrial development..." (Introduction, xiii)

The chapters are broken into four parts. Part I describes briefly the colonial community of São Paulo from the time of its founding by the Jesuits in 1554 through the period of national independence under Dom Pedro I. Part II, reveals the escape of São Paulo from community status and self-subsistent economy to cityhood, especially after Dom Pedro II became Emperor. There was a cultural quickening, some material progress, and the rise of the coffee industry in the state of São Paulo with all the premonitions of eventual monoculture status, not only for the city and state but for the whole of Brazil. Part III brings out, chiefly by quotations, the development of the railroads, the era of positivism, the economic and physical expansion of the city and state, the coming of the immigrants, and the middle class life. Part IV, in five chapters, describes "The Metropolitan Temper," "Industrialism," "The Metropolis as Polis," "Modernism," and "The Anatomy of the Metropolis."

The book has value as a pattern of study which can be followed by researchers preparing biographies of other cities. It contains also a wealth of information for the general reader. It will stimulate discussion and interpretations of the data gathered over the years by Professor Morse. Scholars will be happy with the bibliographical notes at the end of each chapter, which give descriptions of author's and materials, and with the long selective bibliography mentioned above. The index and illustrations are quite satisfactory.

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Efforts of Raymond Robins Toward the Recognition of Soviet Russia and the Outlawry of War, 1917-1933. By Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1958. Pp. ix, 225. Paper cover, \$2.50.

Historians and publicists have already contributed a mass of literature concerning Soviet Russia and its many facets. However, there is still much that can be done to remove the Soviet Union from the category of an enigma. Perhaps it is in the area of American-Russian relations that further research and study can contribute most to a better understanding of the Soviet Union and the current struggle between the West and the Soviet bloc of nations.

This need is partly met by the scholarly work of Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger. The author makes no attempt to write a definitive biography of Raymond Robins, a central figure in American-Russian relations from the administration of Woodrow Wilson to that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. On the contrary, she attempts to present "an exposition of Robin's efforts, after World War I, to bring about the United States recognition of Soviet Russia and the outlawry of war by international agreement."

Raymond Robins, social worker, religious enthusiast, and politician, was a self-made man who championed the cause of the poor and down-

trodden. He was an idealist motivated by the highest ideals of human service. In his efforts to serve his fellow man he was not hindered by racial or national barriers. Following his appointment to the American Red Cross Commission sent to Russia by President Woodrow Wilson in July, 1917, he seized the opportunity to be of service to the Russian people, "to help them find their way from Czarism to democracy and a better standard of human living." His unrestrainable idealism accounted for much of his efforts toward the recognition of Russia and the outlawry of war. It was his burning ambition to eliminate social injustice of all kinds from the face of the earth. He was a visionary who believed (rather naively) that Lenin's program advocating the establishment of a new and worldwide, classless society, would ultimately culminate in the establishment of a better standard of living for the Russian masses, a type of utopia.

Robins' efforts toward the United States recognition of Russia included his attempts to influence presidents, congressmen, and the general public. He was tireless and relentless in his campaign to influence the administrations of Presidents Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge to establish American economic relations with the Soviet regime. Such cooperation, he hoped, would be a stepping stone to the complete recognition of Soviet Russia. However, his efforts and pleas did not produce the desired results. Meanwhile, a combination of circumstances caused Robins to lose some of his enthusiasm for United States recognition of Russia after January, 1924, only to be revived in 1933, at the time of his second trip to the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to ascertain to what extent Robins was influential in the recognition of Russia in November, 1933. He did present arguments in favor of recognition to members of President Roosevelt's cabinet and the "brain trust." Furthermore, Roosevelt did grant Robins an interview before the arrival in Washington of the Soviet foreign commissar, Maxim Litvinov. However, the President had made the decision to recognize Soviet Russia prior to conferring with Robins. Thus it would be an exaggeration to conclude that Robins played the decisive role in this change in United States policy toward Russia.

Robins was also one of the foremost peace advocates of the 1920's. He believed that outlawry of war was something to offer the American people in lieu of the League of Nations. However, it is interesting to observe that he had no part in the initiation of the Kellogg-Briant Pact which was regarded as the climax of the movement.

Apparently, there was no direct connection between Robins work toward outlawry on the one hand, and recognition of Russia on the other. The author was unable to uncover evidence to support the suspicion that Robins and the advocates of recognition were using the outlawry of war as a facade behind which to maneuver in order to achieve their real objective—recognition of the Soviet regime.

Sister Meiburger has made an excellent contribution to a better understanding of the various forces at work—pro and con—concerning the belated acceptance of an historical fact, namely, the Soviet regime in Russia.

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Notes and Comments

A call for help comes from Dr. J. Leon Helguera. He has been awarded a grant from the John Boulton Foundation of Caracas, Venezuela, for the purpose of research in the sources of Venezuelan history in the United States and Canada. This Foundation has in project in an advanced stage the compilation and publication of all the extant manuscript correspondence and papers of the leaders of the revolt against Spain in the northern provinces of South America—Francisco de Miranda, Simón Bolívar, Antonio José de Sucre, and José Antonio Páez. Confronted with the enormous task of gathering the manuscripts which are scattered over the hemisphere in the original or in copy, Dr. Helguera asks the cooperation of archivists, librarians, scholars and private collectors, who might know of the location of the desired materials. Communications should be addressed to him at Post Office Box 5243, State College Station, Raleigh, North Carolina.

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"The French Jesuits and the Idea of the Noble Savage," by George R. Healy of the Bates College faculty, is an interesting study appearing in the April, 1958, *The William and Mary Quarterly*. In their attacks upon the existence of God and upon Christianity the French rationalists of the eighteenth century argued that men in their natural state, primitive men, could get along well enough without the encumbrances of European culture and religion. As proof they pointed to the American Indians, whom they glamorized as brave, noble, and physically perfect, even as was done in the Leather Stocking Series and is done at present in Western novels and in Western television shows. Mr. Healy finds that while the Jesuit missionaries of New France, living amid the squalor of the Indian villages and suffering death and torture at the hands of savages, did not subscribe to the "nobility" of the savage from the natural point of view, they did consider him as a human, with a soul, and therefore noble in the eyes of God. The *philosophes*, however, used parts of the voluminous Jesuit writings on the Indians to establish the myth of the noble Indian.

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"Edmundo O'Gorman and the Idea of America," by Edwin C. Rozwenc of Amherst College, appeared in *American Quarterly*, Summer, 1958. This is a penetrating article revolving around the question: What is America and What is an American? First Mr. Rozwenc indicates how Frederick Jackson Turner's hypothesis pointed to the significance of the frontier and influenced all historical thinking in this country but failed to answer the question. Herbert E. Bolton in his famous "Epic of Greater America" extended the name to all the lands and islands of North and South America and included all peoples of the continents among Americans. O'Gorman, the Mexican thinker and historian, saw a relation between Bolton's idea of America and Hegel's "humiliating thesis" on America and has taken up cudgels against both Bolton and Hegel in his own inimitable way. The extent of O'Gorman's attack and its validity is well explained in this article beginning with Columbus's idea of the New World, Vespucci's concept and Waldseemüller's christening.

* * * *

The *Journal of the History of Ideas*, June, 1958, carried among other interesting articles two on Charles Darwin. Maurice Mandelbaum's "Darwin's Religious Views" traces the evolution of the scientist's beliefs from the strict orthodoxy of the Anglican Church to a helpless agnostic state of mind, stranded somewhere between the arguments of Theists and Atheists. Alvar Ellegard in "Public Opinion and the Press: Reactions to Darwinism," by a novel approach endeavors to estimate the actual percentage of the reaction of people and press to Darwin's *Origin of the Species* for the twelve years following its publication in 1859. By one method of computation he finds that 46% were against Darwinism, and by another method 58% were against Darwinism.

* * * *

Of interest to those investigating the Indian place-names is *Wheeling: A West Virginia Place-Name of Indian Origin*, by Delf Norona. This is a lithoprinted, paper-bound brochure of thirty-eight pages. It is Publication No. 1 of Oglebay Institute, Mansion

Museum, Oglebay Park, Wheeling, West Virginia, and Publication No. 4 of the West Virginia Archeological Society, Moundsville, West Virginia. It may be obtained at either of these addresses. After citing numerous authorities on the early site of Wheeling and on Indian linguistics, Mr. Norona concludes that the name is from the Indian Weel-ink or Weel-unk, meaning "The place where a [human] head is located." The last two pages of the brochure on "Wheeling and Ranonouara," are by M. H. Deardorff, who explains the Huron, Mohawk and Onondaga words for the place.

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Authors of Liberty, by John Coleman, Illustrated by C. Edward Beach, was published in the late 1958 by Vantage Press. Mr. Coleman as a journalist, a columnist, and most recently on radio programs, has constantly endeavored to bring about "a better understanding of the American way of life." In this book of 244 pages he has brought together in informal papers many of the "national shrines, sanctuaries, monuments, and memorials," each introduced by an eloquent quotation. Among the forty-eight more important illustrations of the American way of life selected by Mr. Coleman we find: "The First Americans," the Indians whose memorial is the chiseled figure of Crazy Horse; Williamsburg, Mt. Vernon, Monticello, and the battlefields from Yorktown to the present; the American immortals in the Hall of Fame; the national parks; the national athletic heroes; the leaders of industry and science; the democratic traditions; the underworld; and the circus. Under these general headings practically every phase of American life and all significant sites are mentioned. The list price is \$3.75.